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RADICAL TAX REFORM, MUNICIPAL FINANCE, AND
THE CONSERVATIVE AGENDA

Eric J. Gouvin *
Proponents of a consumption tax system to replace the federal
income tax typically couch their support for radical tax reform in
the language of traditional tax policy goals. They claim that
their reform plans promote the goals of simplicity, economic
efficiency, stability, and equity. This Article examines how well
the proposed tax reforms will achieve those goals in the context
of their anticipated impact on state and local finance. The effects
on state and local governments of a flattened-rate income tax,
flat tax, or a broad federal consumption tax could be enormous
and devastating. The Article finds that all of the reform
proposals fall far short of achieving the traditional goals of tax
policy in the context of state and local finance.
This Article develops an alternative explanation for why the
radical tax proposals are currently under serious consideration.
It suggests that the adverse impact that the federal-level reforms
will have on state and local finance is not an incidental side
effect, but rather is part of a strategy consistent with
conservative thinking to reduce the size of government and to
make taxation more difficult. The alternative explanation views
the tax proposals as a way to advance the conservative political
agenda on at least two fronts: (1) to remove tax expenditures as a
policy tool and thereby reduce the opportunities for "social
engineering" by the central government; and (2) to force a
realignment of federalism issues in the taxation area by making
the total tax burden more transparent and making local
taxation more difficult.
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INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF PAPER

For approximately the past ten years, radical reform of the
federal tax system has been a perennial policy topic in Washington. l
Some of the proposals under discussion call for a "flattened tax"
based on our current income tax system;2 some look to implement a
"flat tax" that would tax business cash flow and individual wages at a
proportional, rather than a progressive rate;3 still others would seek
to replace the entire system with a sales tax or value added tax. 4
Many of these same ideas were given serious consideration in the
early 1980s, and the result was the "flattened" income tax structure
contained in the 1986 Tax Act. 5 Until recently, however, a wholesale

1. Politicians from across the political spectrum have been vigorously proposing
major overhauls to the federal income tax system. In an Issue Brief dated February 21,
2003, the Congressional Research Service identified eleven different tax reform
proposals ranging from Rep. Gephardt's "flatter" tax proposal, through the more
orthodox "flat tax" proposals of Representatives Armey & Shelby and Senator Specter,
and on to the more radical ideas of a National Sales Tax and Value Added Tax. See
JAMES M. BICKLEY, FLAT TAX PROPOSALS AND FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: AN
OVERVIEW, 5-11 (Congo Research Serv., Rep. No. IB95060, 2003) [hereinafter CRS
OVERVIEW], available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreportsl03apr/ib95060.pdf.
In addition to the airing it has received on Capitol Hill, this complex subject has
received an astounding amount of attention in the popular press as well. The public
fascination with the idea of a flat tax may have been the product of media attention
and not the other way around, but, in any event, the popular press has covered the
issue with enthusiasm since at least the 1996 presidential race. See Nancy Gibbs,
Knock 'Em Flat, TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, at 23 (discussing the campaign of Steve Forbes
and his pet project, the flat tax). Candidate John McCain promoted the idea of a flat
tax in his presidential campaign in 2000. James K. Glassman, Who's the Flat-Tax
Candidate? John McCain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2000, at A26. At the other extreme,
even noted tax scholars see the U.S. tax system as being ripe for change. Michael J.
Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112
YALE L.J. 261,261-62 (2002).
2. See discussion infra Part LA. I.
3. See discussion infra Part LA.2. While recent proponents have characterized the
flat tax as a new proposal, it is an idea that has been around since before the modern
income tax was established in 1913. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73
DENY. U. L. REV. 329 (1996) (providing an excellent history of the income tax in the
United States with special attention to recurring debates over progressivity and
proportionality). Economist Milton Friedman has been advocating a proportional tax
for almost 40 years. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 174-76 (1962)
(advocating a flat rate income tax after a large personal deduction, together with the
elimination of the corporate income tax, as a way to eliminate tax-related distortions
in the economy and reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance).
4. See discussion infra Part LA.4.
5. See Slade Gorton, Tax Reform and the Tax Legislative Process, in OPTIONS FOR
TAX REFORM 33, 37 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1984) (noting the popularity of the flat
tax idea in the early 1980s and characterizing the Bradley-Gephardt tax proposal,
which eventually became the 1986 Tax Act, as a "modification of the flat tax
proposal.").
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shift in federal tax policy from progressive income taxation to some
other, more proportional, approach has not enjoyed serious political
backing.6
A major thread in the current debate is a move away from
"income" taxation and toward consumption taxation. 7 The idea
behind the move is that current income taxation policy creates
disincentives for savings and investment, so a shift toward a system
where those activities are essentially free from tax might improve the
national savings rate. s Like proportional taxation, consumption taxes
have been considered in the past, but have never received serious
consideration. 9
This round of tax proposals appears to be only the latest episode
in a long line of tax revolts that have punctuated American history. 10
If the proponents of tax reform see the income tax itself as the
enemy, however, they may be in for quite a fight. In the ninety years
since its enactment, the income tax has taken on a life of its own and
grown to become the most important source of federal revenue.l1 Over
the years, Congress has riddled the tax code with myriad deductions,
credits, exemptions, and exclusions designed to bring about socially
desirable activities, to appease interest groups who thought the
system to be unfair, or to consummate political deals. Consequently,
at this point just about every politically organized group has a vested

6. Progressivity has been built into the federal income tax since the very
beginning and was intended at the time of enactment to promote an overall tax burden
that was roughly proportional, given that the dominant form of federal revenue raising
at the time, tariffs, was widely perceived to be regressive. See Bank, supra note 3, at
377 (noting the idea of making the overall tax burden proportional, and in the article
as a whole, documenting the political support, or lack thereof, for proportional taxation
over the years).
7. For an excellent article placing consumption taxing into the broader context of
taxation theory, see generally Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the
Theory of General and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293 (2002).
8. See John S. Nolan, Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The Merit of an Income Tax
Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'y 207, 212-13 (1995) (noting the
theoretical argument in favor of consumption taxes as a way to foster increased
savings).
9. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An
Example, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2345, 2360 n.27 (1996) (noting the fact that despite two false
starts, federal level consumption taxes have not been given serious consideration).
10. For an entertaining review of tax opposition over the years, see CHARLES
ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTIEN TAXES: THE TAX REVOLTS THAT BUILT AMERICA (1998)
(providing an episodic history of tax revolts in the United States from colonial times
through the 1990s). For a more scholarly treatment of the issue, see Majorie E.
Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2002).
11. For an accessible history of the income tax, see STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE
GREAT TAX WARB (2002).
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interest in the status quo, making wholesale reform of the federal
taxation scheme extremely difficult from a political perspective. 12
On the other hand, people will always hate to pay taxes,
especially high taxes. History has borne this out in the context of the
income tax. Congress reduced the tax base during the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s by granting exemptions, deductions, and credits to
implement various social policies and political compromises. Yet even
as the tax base dwindled, the federal budget continued to rely heavily
on the revenue stream from the income tax. Congress raised
marginal tax rates in order to secure the needed government
revenue. 13 AB tax rates increased and loopholes proliferated, a whole
industry of tax lawyers, tax accountants, and tax shelter promoters
evolved with the sole purpose of reducing or deferring tax liability.14
AB the tax avoidance industry grew, more and more people came to
have a stake in maintaining the status quo of the tax code. At the
same time, however, enough people became concerned by high
marginal rates, among other matters, to force a re-reexamination of
the income tax in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At that time,
commentators and policymakers began to talk seriously about a flat
tax15 and consumption taxes. 16
When the flat tax movement came to life in the early 1980s, it
was in no small part a reaction to the tax shelter industry and the
combination of tax preferences and high marginal tax rates that
12. See Milton Friedman, Why a Flat Tax is Not Politically Feasible, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 30, 1995, at A14 (opining that a flat tax will never be enacted because of
opposition from organized special interest groups and because Congress profits by
selling tax breaks to political supporters).
13. Simple algebra informs us that in order to get the needed revenue, X, where X
is the product of tax base (B) times the tax rate (R) if B is made smaller, R must be
made larger in order to produce the same outcome, X.
14. See, e.g., David M. Einhorn, Unintended Advantage: Equity Reits vs. Taxable
Real Estate Companies, 51 TAX LAw. 203, 217 (1998) ("Another result of the tax
incentives, a result that was not desired and probably not anticipated was the
development of a very substantial tax shelter industry.").
15. In 1981, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka co-authored an op-ed piece for the
Wall Street Journal advocating flat taxes, and that piece ultimately culminated in
their book, The Flat Tax, in 1985. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX
47 (2d ed. 1995).
16. See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 11-36 (rev. ed. 1976)
(questioning the validity of income as a measure of tax responsibility and arguing for
the use of alternative bases such as consumption or wealth); Gordon D. Henderson,
Alternatives to the Income Tax, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM, supra note 5, at 78
(discussing flat taxes, consumption taxes and other alternatives); Henry J. Aaron &
Harvey Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests, and Other Strategies for
Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM, supra note 5, at 106 (discussing various income
tax alternatives); William D Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974) (making the argument that a consumption
tax would be fairer than the income tax).
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made tax shelters work. I7 Proponents of the flat tax wanted to stop
what they perceived to be unfair tax breaks and economically
inefficient business deals that were driven more by tax
considerations than by economics. Is The 1986 attack on tax shelters
was multi-pronged,I9 but its two key elements were right out of the
flat tax play book: (1) broaden the tax base by eliminating or
reducing the tax incentives that attracted tax shelter investments;
and (2) lower marginal tax rates to reduce the value of tax losses. 2o
The flatter tax that was enacted in 1986 did indeed make the
bogeyman of tax shelters disappear.21
Yet even after the broad changes brought about by the 1986 tax
law, people remained dissatisfied with the tax system. Politicians
have exploited that public discontent by pushing their various radical
reform proposals designed to completely replace the existing income
tax scheme. 22 Because the truly abusive tax avoidance problems of
the pre-1986 era have been put to rest, today's proponents of flat rate
17. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 32-39 (1st ed.
1985) (citing, as reasons for adopting the flat tax proposal, the inequity in tax shelters
and in the treatment of capital gains as well as the complexity of the pre-1986 tax
code).
18. Id. at 24, 32-36.
19. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 130-31 (5th ed. 1987)
(describing the 1986 anti-tax shelter provisions).
20. See id.
21. See Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody
Listening?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 617-27 (1998) (giving a concise history of abusive tax
shelters and the legislative response thereto, and concluding that the tax shelter
industry of the 1970s and 1980s is dead). Congress frequently enacts changes to the
tax laws that target specific tax planning strategies, including, but not limited to, tax
shelters. Whether those changes to the law are necessary to curtail abuses or merely
add complexity to the tax code without enhancing fairness or efficiency depends on the
overall context in which the law and the transactions exist, including the transaction
costs or other frictions the taxpayer will encounter in trying to avoid the rule. See
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312
(2001) (discussing "frictions," which are tax planning constraints outside of the tax
law, and their effects on the taxpayers).
22. See David Wessel & Greg Hitt, Anti-IRS Frenzy Gives Republicans a Chance to
Road-Test Plans, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (describing the calculated political
gambit of unleashing a full frontal attack on the Internal Revenue Service as a way to
build support for repeal of the income tax code and its replacement with either a flat
tax or a sales tax). People are susceptible to manipulation in their thinking about tax
policy through the employment of framing devices. See generally Edward J. McCaffery
& Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving
Household Composition (June 10, 2003), USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No.
00-18, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=246408. People are also susceptible through their
inability to aggregate the effects of parallel tax systems. See generally Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the
Evaluation of Tax Systems (Jan. 28, 2002), USC Law School, USC CLEO Research
Paper No. C02-I, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=298648.
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taxes must offer a new rallying cry if they have any hope of
implementing the new taxation schemes they champion. 23 They claim
that their reform plans promote the traditional tax policy goals of
simplicity, economic efficiency, stability, and equity.24 This Article
examines how well the proposed tax reforms will achieve those goals
in the context of their anticipated impact on state and local finance.
The effects on state and local governments of a flattened-rate income
tax, flat tax, or a broad federal consumption tax could be enormous
and devastating. This Article finds that the reform proposals all fall
far short of achieving their purported goals in the context of state
and local finance.
In light of the political philosophy of the radical tax reformers,
the adverse impact on state and local finance may not be an
incidental side effect of federal tax reform. Instead, the disruptive
effects the proposed federal changes will have on municipal finance
may be part and parcel of a strategy to reduce the size of government
by making the total tax burden more visible and making local
taxation more difficult. This Article develops an explanation for why
the radical tax reform proposals are currently under serious
consideration. The explanation views the tax proposals as a way to

23. Indeed, while many proponents of tax reform would like a wholesale revision of
the current scheme, John D. McKinnon, Treasury Weighs Huge Changes in U.S. Tax
Code, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at A2, it may be that the radical reformers have
recognized the reality that public dissatisfaction with the current scheme is not
sufficiently fervent to allow immediate implementation of any radical new taxation
program, Bruce Bartlett, Tax Torture Is Flat Wrong, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,2002, at A16
("[MJost flat-tax supporters have moved away from scrapping the code completely and
adopted a gradualist approach."). Indeed, while President Bush has indicated support
for a consumption tax of some kind, Greg Ip, Bush Floats Shift to Consumption Tax,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A3; he appears to be proposing an incrementalist
strategy to achieve his tax goals, Howard Gleckman, Inching Toward Tax Reform:
President Bush Wants Big Tax Changes-But in Small Increments, BUS. WK., Dec. 16,
2002, at 32.
24. Although the exact formulation of the attributes of a good tax system vary,
commentators almost always include "equity," "efficiency," and "simplicity," together
with some other attribute or two, which often serves as a catch-all for other desirable
aspects of a tax system. I have decided to call my catch-all category "stability." But see
J. Kenneth Blackwell, Keynote Address, Seton Hall Legislative Bureau-Flat Tax
Symposium, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 273, 276-77 (1996) (reflecting the views of the
author, a member of the Kemp Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Policy,
identifying six requirements for any tax reform proposal: simplicity, fairness,
neutrality (what rve called efficiency), visibility (discussed later), stability, and
freedom for growth (included in my listing of efficiency)); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO
REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 58 (Comm. Print 1995) (noting that the criteria for
judging a tax system are economic efficiency, fairness (including both horizontal
fairness and the ability to pay taxes), simplicity, and the ease of administration,
enforceability, evasion (this could be thought of as being included in stability)).
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advance the conservative political agenda on at least two fronts: (1)
to remove the policy tool of tax expenditures from the Congress and
thereby reduce the opportunities for "social engineering" by the
central government; and (2) to force a realignment of federalism
issues in the taxation area by making the total tax burden more
transparent and making local taxation more difficult.
This Article begins with a quick overview of the major types of
tax reform proposals currently under consideration in Congress. It
then turns to a discussion of how these proposals would affect
various aspects of state and local finance. The third section discusses
the proposals and their effects in light of the traditional policy goals
of equity, efficiency, simplicity and stability and finds that with
regard to the impact on state and local finance, the reform proposals
do not achieve any of the purported policy goals. The last section
discusses conservative political principles and describes how a
radical tax reform would advance those ideals even if it does not
advance the traditional goals of good tax policy.
A.

Overview ofCurrent Proposals

This Article will not duplicate the efforts of the many books and
articles examining and comparing the major tax reform proposals. 25
Nevertheless, while in-depth analysis of individual proposals is
beyond the scope of this Article, it may be useful for our purposes to
identify the four major categories into which the major proposals fall:

25. See generally, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SIMPLIFICATION app. D, at D-4 to D-16 (2001) (describing recommendations for
simplification, pursuant to section 8022(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986);
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 17-50 (Comm. Print 1995)
(describing proposals before Congress, including the value-added tax, the Armey "Flat
Tax," the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax and a national retail sales tax) [hereinafter JOINT
COMM. ANALYSIS]; GREGG A. ESENWEIN ET AL., THE FLAT TAX AND OTHER REFORM
PROPOSALS: OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES (Cong. Research Serv., Rep. No. 96-315E, 1998);
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (describing the leading
proposals and offering analysis by academic commentators); CRS OVERVIEW, supra
note 1; Alice G. Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1355 (1996) (comparing tax proposals); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax,
Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A
Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000); Alan
Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Added Tax,
Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281
(1996) (giving an overview of competing tax reform proposals).
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The Flattened Income Tax

The first, and least radical, tax reform plan is the one proposed
in the 105th Congress by Representative Dick Gephardes to continue
the base broadening and rate flattening process he championed in
the years leading up to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.27
Although this plan would continue to employ income as the tax base,
it would bring radical changes to the income tax as currently
configured. Under this plan, all itemized or individual deductions (as
opposed to the "above-the-line" deductions), except the home
mortgage interest deduction, would be eliminated to make the
income tax base quite broad. 28 Marginal rates would be lowered to a
range of twenty- through thirty-four percent, with three quarters of
the population paying an effective rate often percent.29
2.

HalllRabushka-Inspired Flat Taxes

The second group of proposals are those inspired by the "flat tax"
proposal developed in the 1980s by Hoover Institution scholars
Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka. 30 The flat tax proposals from
Representative Richard Armer! together with Senator Richard
Shelbr2 and the version from Senator Arlen Specter3 seem to fit the
HalllRabushka model. Some of the ideas advanced by 1996
presidential hopefuls Steve Forbes and Pat Buchanan probably
belong in this category as well. 34
These plans vary but they share the attribute of moving away
from income taxation and toward consumption taxation. 35 The plans

26. H.R. 3620, 105th Congo (1998). This particular version of tax reform does not
appear to be under consideration in the 108th Congress.
27. See Richard A. Gephardt, The Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax, in OnIONS FOR TAX
REFORM, supra note 5, at 74 (describing Representative Gephardt's push for a broader
based, lower rate income tax in the early 1980s).
28. H.R. 3620 § 202.
29. See CRS OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8-9; RICHARD GEPHARDT, AN EVEN
BETTER PLACE 171-72 (1999).
30. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 15, at 52-103 (describing their tax plan).
31. H.R. 1040, 107th Congo (2001).
32. S. 1040, 107th Congo (2001).
33. S. 907, 108th Congo (2003).
34. For an explanation of the proposed tax plans of Steve Forbes and Pat
Buchanan in 1996, see Dan Goodgame, Is This Tax Flat Unfair? Tax Reform Is a Good
Idea, but Forbes' Plan Will Make Newt's Cutbacks Look Insipid, TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, at
30-31.
35. A noted tax scholar has opined that the HalllRabushka model suffers from
major design flaws that will make it impracticable as an effective revenue raising
mechanism. See generally David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 599 (2000) (noting, among other things, that the HalllRabushka tax is easy to
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would repeal the current individual and corporate income taxes,
along with the estate and gift tax and replace them with a wage tax
and a cash-flow tax on business. The wage tax would only pick up
wages, salary, and other compensation; it would not cover dividends,
interest, capital gains, or other returns to investment. 3s The plans
would eliminate all individual deductions in their current form but
could provide for progressivity through a series of family exemption
allowances. The business activities tax would exempt investment
income from tax but would otherwise tax all receipts less the costs of
purchases from other businesses, wages, and pension contributions.
The tax rate for both components would be around twenty percent. 37
3.

The Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax

The third category is the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax
which was originally introduced in the 104th Congress by Senators
Sam Nunn, Pete Domenici, and J. Robert Kerrey,38 and was
championed in subsequent Congresses by Representative English.39
The USA tax is also a consumption tax, but it works a bit differently
than that the HalllRabushka plan. It taxes businesses on gross
profits-actual receipts less actual disbursements. 4o It does not,
however, permit the business taxpayer to deduct employee
compensation and fringe benefits in calculating the taxable amount,
although it does provide a credit for payroll taxes. 41 At the individual
level, the USA tax taxes wages, salaries, commissions, life insurance
proceeds, reductions in savings, fringe benefits, capital gains,
interest, and dividends. It retains some of the popular deductions
and exclusions from income, including the deduction for home
mortgage interest and the exclusion of interest on state and local
bonds. 42 It also allows individual taxpayers to reduce their taxable

avoid, which will lead to inefficiency, complexity, higher rates, and a shift in the
distribution ofthe tax burden).
36. See Abreu, supra note 25, at 1361-62 (discussing the decision to specify a
narrow tax base).
37. All tax rate estimates should be taken with a grain of salt. See generally
Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and
Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197 (1999).
3S. S. 722, 104th Congo (1995).
39. H.R. 269, 10Sth Congo (2003) (under the name "Simplified USA Tax of 2003").
40. Id. § 30l.
41. See id.; see also Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Consumption-Based Tax Reform and the
State-Local Sector: A Study for the American Tax Policy Institute, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
115, 122 (1996) (describing the tax base).
42. See Abreu, supra note 25, at 1366 nn.34-35 (describing the deductions and
exclusions under the USA tax); Richard J. Joseph, The "Consumption Tax and Flat"
Taxes Revisited, 69 TAX NOTES 211-12 (1995); Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax:
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income by the amount of money they have saved each year. In this
way, it aims to tax the amount of income that was consumed. 43
4.

Value Added and Retail Sales Taxes

The fourth and final group of proposals are those calling for a
National Retail Sales Tax ("NRST") or a Value Added Tax (''VAT"). A
proposal for an NRST has been introduced by Representative Billy
Tauzin.44 Senator Richard Lugar has also advocated an National
Sales Tax. 45 A transactional VAT similar to those employed in many
European countries46 would have an impact on states similar to that
of an NRST. Discussions on Capitol Hill have included a VAT as one
of the possibilities for revamping the federal tax system, but reform
proponents have not been employing that terminology to describe
their proposals. 47 Issues arising under these taxes, which seek to tax
all consumption, include: the logistics of trying to capture all
transactions in goods and services in a sprawling complex economy;
the availability of tax exemption for sub-federal government units;
and the need to avoid the cascade problem of taxing goods that pass

Borrowing as a Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 138-41 (1995) (discussing debt issues in
both Flat Tax and USA Tax).
43. See Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and
Comparisons in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 54, 54-57 (describing the
underlying philosophy of the USA tax and providing an illustration of how the tax
would be calculated).
44. H.R. 2717, 107th Congo (2001).
45. S. Res. 16, 105th Congo (1997).
46. A Value Added Tax is a mechanism for including all of the output of the
economy; in effect the tax base is national income. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, TAX
REFORM, THE RICH AND THE POOR 117-20 (2d ed. 1989) (providing an overview of value
added taxation including a summary of how the tax base is adjusted for investment
expenditures and how individual returns are adjusted to capture the value added by
the taxpayer).
47. Of the proposals receiving serious attention on Capitol Hill, both
Representative Armey's proposal, H.R. 1040, 107th Congo (2001), and Senator
Specter's proposal, S. 822, 106th Congo (2000), are essentially subtraction-method
value added taxes, where "purchases are subtracted from sales and the tax rate is then
applied to the net figure," PECHMAN, supra note 46, at 118. Neither proposal, however,
identifies them as such. Former Representative Gibbons had introduced a bill for a
Value Added Tax in the 104th Congress. H.R. 4050, 104th Congo (1996). The proposals
that have been made thus far attempt to integrate some of the VAT principles into a
two-level, business and individual tax as a purported replacement for the income tax.
See generally Lester B. Synder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the
Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other
Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1996) (discussing proposals that rely "on a
combination VAT and income tax base").

RADICAL TAX REFORM

2004]

419

through many hands (and may be taxed at each step) on their way to
the ultimate consumer. 48
Each of the proposals outlined above takes a different tack in the
course of raising federal revenue. Because of the differences among
the various proposals, they will affect state and municipal finances in
different ways. Even with that caveat, there are some effects from
each of the proposals that one can anticipate.
II. LIKELY EFFECTS OF RADICAL TAX REFORM ON STATE AND LOCAL
FINANCE

The effects of reform plans that call for moving away from
income taxation and toward consumption taxation will be felt far
beyond the federal treasury. The proposals will affect state and local
finance in several ways, including by making state and local income
taxes more difficult to administer, by curtailing state and local
revenue sources, by disrupting the tax exempt municipal bond
market, and by hampering the ability of states and municipalities to
export their tax burdens through federal deductibility.
A.

The Effective Repeal ofState and Local Income Taxes

State and local governments derive a significant portion of their
tax revenues from state and local income taxes. The informational
infrastructure necessary to administer such tax schemes is complex,
however, so virtually all state and local income taxes "piggyback" on
the federal income tax for much of the administrative mechanism
needed to implement such taxes in a fair and efficient manner. 49
State and local tax authorities rely on the federal income tax
infrastructure in many ways. For example, state and local tax
agencies utilize federal regulations defining "taxable income and
allowable deductions," receive copies of taxpayer filings prepared for
federal authorities, and receive the benefits from both federal audits
and from legal enforcement actions brought by federal authorities
against taxpayers. 50 They also tap into the national framework of

48. For a discussion of issues arising under a Value Added Tax and a National
Retail Sales Tax, see generally Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value·Added Tax in
Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 91, and
Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales Tax, in
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 110.
49. See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 128-29 (discussing the piggyback effect and
noting the difficulty with which any given state could maintain the informational
infrastructure necessary to tax income at the state level if there were not federal tax
system).
50. Michael Mazerov et aI., Federal Tax Restructuring and State and Local
Governments: An Introduction to the Issues and the Literature, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1459, 1460-61 (1996).
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informational reporting even though they lack the legal authority to
compel reporting from nonresident corporations and other entities. 51
Given the immense administrative costs of an income tax system, it
seems unlikely that any individual state could retain a traditional
individual or corporate income tax on its own.52
Although all of the current reform proposals could have
potentially devastating effects on state and local income taxation
efforts, it should be noted that the proposals differ in the degree to
which they hobble existing state and local income taxes. The
Gephardt flattened tax and the USA tax would leave in place the
essential national income reporting system and that alone would
likely permit states to continue to administer their own income taxes.
Both of these proposals, however, would cause radical changes in the
definition of the tax base in a way that might not coordinate well
with the public policy of individual states. The benefits of the current
"piggyback" approach would be largely lost if the states chose to
define the tax base in a method inconsistent with the new federal
base definition and especially if the states desired to exempt from
tax, or tax at a differential rate, a component of income no longer
considered special under the federal scheme. In those situations,
obtaining at the state level the information needed to administer the
tax (especially from non-resident businesses) would be logistically
(and perhaps legally) difficult.
The HalllRabushka-inspired plans and the National Sales or
Value Added Tax, if enacted, would spell disaster for state-level
income tax programs. Because federal tax changes that depart
radically from the traditional model of income taxation would have
no need for the types of data needed to run an income tax, one would
assume the federal government will stop collecting that data and
therefore the federal informational infrastructure necessary for the
administration of a state income tax would be lost completely. There
may be some solace for states in that both the USA tax and the
51.

[d. at 1461.
52. [d. One could contemplate the continuance of state income tax systems where
Congress either makes changes to the current system but leaves the informational
infrastructure in place or where the states form a compact among themselves to pool
their individual jurisdictional authorities and create a nationwide information
reporting system. See id. at 1475 (discussing the interstate compact idea). In any
event, if state-level income taxation is to continue, it would require some extraordinary
mechanism to permit it to do so. Even under the existing tax system, states are fmding
their traditional methods of determining tax nexus, tax bases, and activity allocation
increasingly anachronistic in the Internet age. Without some kind of interstate
coordination of tax information, the current system may be hobbled. See Robert J.
Cline, Can the Current State and Local Business Tax System Survive the New
Economy Challenge?, 24 STATE TAX NOTES 241 (Apr. 15, 2002) (commenting on the
difficulties facing states whose tax agencies must adapt to economic changes).
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various HalllRabushka style flat tax bills would permit states to
substitute a broad-based, apportioned, state-level subtraction
method value added tax for their existing corporate income taxes and
thereby piggyback on that informational infrastructure. More
extreme forms of federal taxation reform, however, such as a national
retail sales tax or a European-style value added tax, would likely
force the states to repeal their corporate and individual income taxes
as well. 53
Congress seems to be largely unconscious of the effect that
wholesale federal income tax reform will have on state and local
governments' ability to levy income taxes. In the Joint Committee on
Taxation's study examining the impact of federal income tax reform
on state and local governments,54 there is only a brief mention of the
difficulties state and local governments would have in administering
income taxes in the absence of a federal income tax infrastructure. 55
In light of the seriousness of the disruption such a change would
cause, the ramifications of federal tax law changes on state level tax
schemes should receive much more attention.
B.

Curtailing Other Revenue Raising Options

Fundamental changes at the federal level will cut off some
revenue-raising options at the state and local level. The imposition of
a federal sales tax or value-added tax (''VAT''), for example, in
addition to depriving state and local governments of the option to tax
income effectively, will precipitate other revenue-raising problems.
Given state and local governments' dependence on sales tax
revenues, the addition of a federal level tax on top of existing state
53. Even in these extreme situations, if Congress repealed the federal tax without
repealing the federal income tax reporting system, states might nevertheless remain
able to carry out their income tax schemes. See Mazerov et aI., supra note 50, at 1462
(opining that absent a decision by Congress to leave reporting schemes intact, a
decision to repeal the federal income tax would force states to repeal their income
taxes).
54. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1996).
55. While the Joint Committee on Taxation was aware of the essential role the
federal income tax plays in the administration of state income taxes and the potential
repercussions of federal changes for the states, they nevertheless did not consider the
implications of scrapping the federal infrastructure to be worthy of more than a
sentence. [d. at 70 (noting that "[bJecause most of the States that collect individual
and corporate income taxes model their State income tax systems after the Federal
income tax system, any significant restructuring of the Federal income tax system
could have considerable corollary implications for such States"). Without any real
analysis, the Committee Report merely noted that "the elimination of a Federal
income tax ... would entail a considerable increase in the complexity and expense of
administering a State income tax system." [d.
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and local taxes will create severe policy problems for state and local
tax authorities. 56 Canada experienced similar problems when it
adopted a VAT in 1991. 57 The issues raised by the imposition of a
federal level sales tax or VAT primarily include eliminating
competition and promoting coordination between the federal level tax
and the state and local taxes. A big issue will be how to make the tax
bases of the two systems similar enough to avoid major compliance
problems.
The reality of a combined state and federal sales tax or VAT
would be a very visible and very large incidence of tax on each and
every transaction in goods and services. Taxpayers will be reminded
of the cost of government over and over again in a much more
immediate way than they are when their income taxes are
automatically withheld from their paycheck every two weeks. This
could have several effects on tax policy, including: (a) a "crowding
out" effect in which the federal tax plus the local tax creates "political
pressure for immediate reductions in state and local sales taxes"; (b)
"political pressure brought by the business community" (which must
collect the sales and VAT taxes) for conforming the state and local
sales tax base with the federal base "or elimination of the statellocal
sales taxes entirely"; and (c) administrative issues with federalism
overtones if states are charged with administering the federal sales
tax scheme. 58
While the sales tax and VAT approaches are most worrisome, all
of the reform proposals raise problems for local property taxation
schemes. To the extent that base-broadening plans eliminate the
home mortgage interest and property tax deductions, property values

56. Of course, in the Internet age, state and local reliance on the sales tax is
already problematic. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local
Reliance on the Retail Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000
BYU L. REV. 77 (detailing howe-commerce serves to aggravate the defects of the retail
sales tax).
57. See Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State
Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 182 (1998) ("Canada enacted the GST
without the full support and cooperation of all the provinces, and this has caused
difficulties."); see also Sean C. Aylward, Proposed GST Reforms in Canada Include
Integrated National, Provincial VAT, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 473, 473 (1994) (noting that at
the time of the adoption of the GST, Canada had "ten different broad-base sales taxes,
eight provincial single-stage sales taxes (in all provinces except Quebec and Alberta),
and two multi-stage sales taxes (the federal GST and the Quebec QST)....
Nonetheless, repeated efforts by the [federal) government to negotiate a harmonized
National Sales Tax failed to win provincial support.").
58. Mazerov, supra note 50, at 1466-67; see also Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 120
(noting that as five states do not currently impose a sales tax, asking them to collect a
federal sales tax would create an awkward situation).
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are likely to decrease (certainly in the short term).59 Because homes
are a major component of local real property tax bases, this likelihood
could lead to a reduction in local property tax revenues in the
absence of offsetting tax rate increases. Of course, these
perturbations should only last until the next general assessment, but
the resulting readjustment of the property tax rate to make the local
budget balance could be politically difficult or even legally
impossible, considering that some states impose legal limitations on
the power of local governments to raise property tax rates. so To
complicate matters further, this stress on the property tax regime
will occur at a time when state and local tax authorities already face
a troubling erosion of the property tax base through federal
restrictions and preemptions. s1
In addition, the far-reaching changes in federal tax incentives
could upset long-standing expectations about sales tax revenues at
the state and local level. Because one goal of the wholesale shift of
the federal tax system from taxation of income to taxation of
consumption is to encourage savings and investment, policy makers
must worry about the effect that the concomitant expected decrease
in consumption would have on tax revenues. Given the key role
played by sales taxes in state and local finance, a significant drop in
consumption induced by federal tax law changes could reduce
significantly state and local revenues from their sales taxes.

59. Dennis R. Capozza et aI., Taxes, Mortgage Borrowing, and Residential Land
Prices in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 171, 191 (Henry J. Aaron
& William G. Gale eds., 1996) (concluding that in the sixty-three metropolitan
statistical areas ("MSAs") they examined, property values will decrease about five
percent on average but that some MSAs will experience only a two percent decrease
while others will lose as much as thirteen percent in value); see Robert Eisner, The
Proposed Sales and Wages Tax-Fair, Flat, or Foolish? in ROBERT E. HALL, ET AL.,
FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 42, 75 (1996) ("[Tlhe elimination of tax
deductibility for mortgage interest will hit housing hard."). But see Roberta F. Mann,
The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1347 (2000) (advocating repeal of the deduction
on the ground that, as currently constituted, the provision encourages urban sprawl
and is not available to all potential home owners and also on the ground that a repeal
might induce lower housing prices).
60. The most famous of these restrictions are California's Proposition 13, CAL.
CONST. art. XIII §l(a), and Massachusetts' Proposition 2 'h, MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 59,
§21C (Law Co-op. 1990). See also PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 277 (noting that "ten
states impose limits on local taxes or expenditures").
61. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS & NAT'L GOVERNORS' AsS'N,
FINANCING STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990S, at 51-55 (1993) [hereinafter FINANCING
STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990s1 (describing federal legislation and court decisions
that have restricted the personal and real property subject to state and local taxation).
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Effect on State / Local Borrowing

All of the tax reform proposals would have a profound impact on
the municipal bond market. Every federal income tax act since the
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 has contained an
exemption for the interest from the obligations of state and local
borrowings from federal income taxation. 62 However, although the
exemption of state and local obligations from federal taxation has a
long pedigree, it is not required by the Constitution. 63 Because there
is no Constitutional bar to including this source of income, all of the
major tax reform proposals except some of the flat tax proposals
either reduce (in the case of the USA tax) or eliminate (flattened tax
proposals), or render inapplicable (sales tax and VAT) the federal tax
exemption for interest paid on state and local government
borrowings. 64 The impact of eliminating the federal subsidy on the
interest expense of state and local government is a matter of debate
among economists and policy makers.65 What is not at issue, however,
are the observed effects of tax policy changes and anticipated tax
policy changes on tax exempt bond spreads-serious talk of tax
reform narrows the spread between taxable and tax exempt
obligations, apparently as bond buyers incorporate a heavier discount
to take account of the possibility of future tax changes. 66 In the 1996
presidential campaign, for example, economists observed an inverse

62. See ROBERT S. AMDuRSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE
LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 440 (1992) (noting the continuing tax exemption for
interest on municipal obligations).
63. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (overruling earlier precedent
and holding that the Constitution does not require that interest on municipal
obligations be exempted from a nondiscriminatory federal tax on bondholders).
64. See JOINT COMM. ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 83-100 (describing the various
proposals).
" 19, at 123-27 (describing the debate about the
65. Compare PECHMAN, supra note
economic justification for the deductibility of state and local bond interest and
concluding that such an exemption is economically inefficient because the interest
saved by the borrower is less than half the revenue lost by the Treasury) with Maxwell
A. Miller & Mark A. Glick, The Resurgence of Federalism: The Case for Tax-Exempt
Bonds, 1 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 25 (1997) (eschewing conventional analysis of the tax
exemption as a disguised subsidy that creates an economically inefficient transfer and
asserting that principles of federalism should preclude the federal-level taxation of
state and local obligations).
66. See James M. Poterba, Explaining the Yield Spread Between Taxable and Tax·
Exempt Bonds: The Role of Expected Tax Policy, in STUDIES IN STATE AND LOCAL
PuBLIC FINANCE 5 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1986) (showing that expected changes in tax
policy have an important effect on yield spread between taxable and tax exempt
securities).
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correlation between candidate Steve Forbes' popularity and the tax
exempt spread. 67
The importance of tax exempt financing for cities is hard to
gauge in dollar amounts, but it is substantial by almost anyone's
reckoning. In 1995, the combined debt load of state and local
governments in the United States was approximately $1.2 trillion. 68
The federal tax exemption allowed state and local bond issuers to
save approximately $12.9 billion in interest costS. 69 Even small
changes in the costs of financing an amount that large will translate
into a very large number. Yet despite the widely understood negative
impact the tax reform proposals would have on the market for
municipal debt, only the USA tax makes any attempt to blunt the
adverse effect.70 The other proposals would wreak havoc in the tax
exempt market.
Starting with the flattened-rate tax proposal, the base
broadening component of that plan would eliminate the tax
exemption for municipal bonds. The effect of such a change would be
to force municipal issuers to offer higher yields in order to provide an
after-tax return to investors commensurate with the return they
could receive from taxable obligations. Even if political pressures
were to result in the retention of the exclusion for municipal bond
interest, the rate-lowering component of the plan would greatly
reduce the value ofthe tax preference. 71 The implications oflowering
67. See JOEL SLEMROD & TIMOTHY GREIMEL, DID STEVE FORBES SCARE THE
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET? (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 6583,
1998) (describing the effect of Steve Forbes' political strength (as measured by the
Iowa Electronic Market, which allows participants to trade on political candidates'
prospects on the spread of 5 and 30 year municipal obligations and observing a marked
contraction of the spread on 5 year obligations whenever Forbes' political fortunes
rose, while finding a more muted effect on 30 year obligations), available at
http://www.nber.org/paperslw6583.
68. See Richard Briffault, Public Finance in the American Federal System: Basic
Patterns and Current Issues, 2 COLUM. J. EURO. L. 533, 546 (1996) (citing figures from
a Wall Street Journal article).
69. Id.
70. The USA tax would continue to provide an exclusion for tax-exempt interest,
but in light of its rate lowering objective, the value of the tax deduction would be
diluted significantly.
71. A simple example illustrates this concept. Let's take an investor in a
hypothetical high income tax bracket, let's call it forty percent. Let's further stipulate
that the investor is faced with an investment choice between two equally risky
securities: a taxable bond carrying a ten percent current yield and a tax exempt bond
offering a seven percent yield (again, for simplicity's sake let's focus on current yield
instead of the more appropriate yield to maturity). In a tax-free world, of course the
investor would take the ten percent security, assuming as stated that the issuers are
equally risky. But the tax consequences change the dynamics. For the ten percent
taxable bond, the effective rate of return is only six percent (interest payment of ten
percent minus forty percent taxes). Since the tax exempt bond offers a seven percent
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tax rates is obvious-bond yields will go up, and the differential
between taxable and non-taxable bond rates will narrow even
further. Under the flattened tax plan, state and local borrowing will
be adversely affected. Of course, the wealth of current owners of tax
exempt securities will be adversely affected as well, as the value of
those bonds will fall once the market demands a higher yield to
compensate for the lack of tax exemption.
Under the HalllRabushka inspired plans and the VAT and retail
sales tax, interest on municipal bonds would not be taxed directly
either because the interest is explicitly excluded from the tax base or
because the focus of the tax base is elsewhere. While on first blush
that appears to be good news for tax exempt issuers, the bad news is
that all other issuers of debt will be treated the same way. So under
the HalllRabushka style taxes, the interest on a bond from the City
of Boston will not be taxable, but the interest on a bond from a
similarly rated private issuer will not be taxed either. The result, as
with the flattened tax proposal, will be to eliminate the spread
between municipal and private debt obligations.72
The cost of tax exempt financing to the Federal Treasury has
long been a target for tax reformers who want to improve the
economic efficiency of the tax system. Yet the elimination of tax
exemption will increase burdens at the state-local level. Replacing
tax exemption with a federal interest subsidy to municipalities, as
has been proposed in the past,73 while sound in theory, will be
inefficient and costly in practice due to administration costs and
delay. Additionally, if the federal subsidy is not pegged to the correct
market rate, it will skew incentives for public borrowing. The
logistics of budgeting at the federal level for the subsidies arising out
of state and local activity would be formidable. The possibility of
official corruption and pork barrel politics are bound to enter any

return, the investor will take the tax exempt bond. If the investor's marginal rate is
lowered to twenty five percent, however, the after-tax return on the taxable bond is
seven and a half percent, so the investor will take the taxable obligation.
72. Whether municipal yields will rise to meet private yields or private yields will
fall to meet municipal yields is anyone's guess, but it seems likely that municipalities
will incur higher costs of borrowing under a flat tax. See DOUGLAS R. SEASE & TOM
HERMAN, THE FLAT-TAX PRIMER 93 (1996) (noting the difficulty of predicting price
movements in the bond market, but suggesting that municipalities will pay more
under a flat tax).
73. See PEeRMAN, supra note 19, at 126 (noting the idea and the approaches to an
explicit federal subsidy for state and local borrowing that have been proposed in the
recent past); see also Who Profits from Tax-Exempt Bonds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1981,
at A30 (advocating a direct subsidy to state and local governments). The idea of having
the federal government pay thirty to forty percent of the debt interest payments owed
by the states on their debt securities was actually proposed in 1969, but was never
adopted. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 172-74 (1969).
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subsidy program. Finally, administrative considerations and the lag
time of receiving the promised subsidy from the federal government,
make interest subsidies an unattractive option for state and local
governments.

D. Elimination of Exportability Through Federal Deduction of
State and Local Taxes.
All of the tax reform proposals would eliminate the deductibility
of state and local income and property taxes in determining a
taxpayer's federal tax liability, or render such an adjustment
irrelevant to the tax base. Under the current arrangement, taxpayers
who itemize are permitted to deduct from their federal taxable
income the amount they have paid in state and local taxes (except
sales tax). The net effect to the taxpayer is to receive a subsidy from
the federal government for a portion of their local tax liability.74
Consequently, a portion of local taxes is borne by the nation's
taxpayers in general.
Eliminating the deductibility of state and local taxes greatly
reduces the ability of tax policymakers to "export" the burden of local
taxes to a larger population. 75 Reasonable minds may differ over
whether exportability is a good idea from a policy point of view.
Where "local" improvements and infrastructure are technically made
by a municipality, but benefit an entire metropolitan region, the case
for exportation is quite strong. 76 On the other hand, if there are no
positive externalities of a locally debt-financed project, the argument
for exportation is much weaker.77 One could, however, make the case
that inner cities which serve as commercial and cultural hubs, but
74. Whether this subsidy is efficient is a debatable question, but it probably is not.
See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 492 (1996) (concluding that
arguments in favor of deductibility of state and local taxes are not as strong as the
contention that the benefits of local government equal the costs imposed through local
taxes, but fmding ultimate policy decision about the wisdom of the deduction difficult
and more likely to be decided by political than economic considerations).
75. State and local governments might still "export" a portion of their tax burden
by imposing taxes or user fees on activities that are likely to be paid by non-residents,
such as a hotel room occupancy tax. See Robert D. Ebel, Comment on Tax Exporting
Federal Deductibility and State Tax Structure," 12 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT.
127, 128-9 (1993) (discussing direct and indirect methods of exportation outside of
federal deductibility).
76. See PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 295-97 (making the argument for exporting
municipal finance costs on the grounds that inner-city infrastructure has positive
externalities and that the cities themselves may lack the resources to finance the
improvements).
77. See, DANIEL SHAVlRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR GREATER
UNIFORMITY 80-81 (1993) ("Without positive externalities from a jurisdiction's
providing public goods, tax exportation is clearly inconsistent with fiscal federalism.").
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which may not have a large population, and rural areas that require
a certain amount of infrastructure, but lack the critical mass of
taxpayers to make such expenditures affordable, are good candidates
for appropriate exportation, merely because the nation has an
interest in maintaining a national infrastructure of government
services like airports, education, and police. This is so even if
particular pockets of the country cannot feasibly finance the required
improvements on the taxpayer base under their jurisdiction.
In any event, eliminating deductibility of state and local taxes
from a flattened income tax, or rendering such an adjustment
irrelevant by enacting one of the other proposals, will have the effect
of increasing the "tax price" of state and local services. 7s This sticker
shock will undoubtedly have major political consequences for state
and local governments. 79
Areas of the country where local governments rely more heavily
on property and income taxes than on sales taxes and user fees will
be affected more dramatically.so One factor that influences the
imposition of taxes as opposed to user fees under the current scheme
of taxation is the availability of the federal tax deduction as a way to
ameliorate the effect of local taxes. The elimination of that device
could result in the imposition of more user fees as states and
localities move away from an ability to pay standard toward a fee for
services approach to public finance.
E.

Other Effects on State and Local Governments

It is, of course, impossible to estimate with precision all of the

effects a fundamental change in federal tax policy will have on any
aspect of our economy. The four issues discussed above are likely to
be the biggest problem areas for state and local governments, but it
is by no means an exhaustive list. For example, the possibility exists
that under the sales tax proposals, state and local governments
might not be exempt from taxation and would also be liable for taxes
on the wages of their employees. sl Although this and other effects
may pose serious problems for state and local governments, they will
not be discussed here.
78. See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax
Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. OF POL. ECON. 710 (1987);
Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal Deductibility, and the Tax Structure, 12 J.
OF POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109 (1993).
79. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
80. See Capozza et al., supra note 59, at 191-92 (concluding that the adverse
impact of the elimination of property tax deductibility will be greatest in the Northeast
and lightest in the South).
81. See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 120-22 (describing the effects of the
proposals).
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III. GOALS OF TAX POLICY
Traditionally, the rhetoric of tax policy requires that tax
proposals be justified in terms of several key criteria-equity,
efficiency, simplicity, and stability. In a perfect world, tax revenues
should be collected as fairly as possible, produce as little unintended
distortion in the economy as possible, be as simple to administer,
comply with, and understand as possible, and be predictable and
reliable enough to allow both the public and private sectors to make
long run economic plans. These goals are easier to state than they
are to achieve.
A.

Equity

Discussions of "equity" in tax policy generally break the concept
into categories of "horizontal equity" and "vertical equity." The tax
reform proposals under consideration will have a major effect on both
of these ideas.
1.

Horizontal Equity

A common theme in American tax policy has been that
individuals with equal ability to pay taxes should pay the same
amount of tax. A tax system which possesses this quality is said to
possess horizontal equity.s2 Under our present tax system, the
principle of horizontal equity is sometimes violated. In some cases,
individuals in similar circumstances bear different tax burdens
because some forms of income are exempt from tax while others are
taxed at favorable rates. S3
Under an income tax, horizontal equity is primarily a function of
how comprehensively taxable income is defined. If "income" from all
sources is taxed (and taxed at the same rate) then horizontal equity
would be achieved. In this regard, the flattened tax proposal
advances the goal of horizontal equity, but the other plans do not.
The tax reform proposals discussed in this Article purport to increase
equity in the tax system, but the new base definitions open new
areas of horizontal inequity. The most obvious problem is that in the
attempt to bolster savings and investment by making interest and

82. See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case For Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39,
87-88 (1996) (discussing the concept of horizontal equity and differences of opinion
about how it should be defmed).
83. For example, if Taxpayer A receives his income from wages and Taxpayer B
receives her income from capital gains and interest on municipal bonds, then Taxpayer
A pays a significantly higher tax because capital gains and municipal bond interest
income are given a tax break. under current law.
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dividend income tax exempt, the reforms would not eliminate
problems of horizontal equity, but would merely reconfigure them. 84
2.

Vertical Equity

While horizontal equity seeks equal treatment of individuals in
similar economic positions, vertical equity seeks to ensure that
individuals with greater ability to pay tax do in fact pay more tax. 85
Not all participants in the tax debate embrace the idea of vertical
equity, as it seems linked in many minds with income redistribution
and party politics. 86 Where horizontal equity is concerned more with
the tax base, vertical equity is concerned with the tax rate
structure.B7 While the tax rate levied in a tax system is a function of
84. See Eisner, supra note 59, at 44 (noting that "the flat tax substitutes serious
new distortions for those it would eliminate").
85. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs ofthe Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 919, 933-58 (1997) (providing an exhaustive discussion of the concept of vertical
equity from several theoretical points of view). One commonly offered justification for
progressive income taxation is based on the idea of the declining marginal utility of
income. Id. at 941-45. Progressive taxes assume the declining marginal utility of
income. Id. From this theory it follows that the 100,000th dollar of income to a wealthy
person has a lower marginal utility than the 100th dollar of income to a poor person.
Id. Relatively speaking, a wealthy person's dollars are worth less than a poor person's,
and so wealthy people should pay more taxes as a portion of their income than poor
people do. Id. Conversely, one might think that paying taxes hurts less as wealth
increases. Id.; see also Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal
Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2001)
(arguing that "any defmition of fairness must incorporate the ability to pay concept").
Flat tax advocates vehemently disagree with the declining marginal utility theory of
money and find it an unconvincing justification for progressivity. See WALTER J. BLUM
& HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 56-63 (1953)
(making the argument against the declining marginal utility of money). For a fine
collection of essays surveying the topic of taxing the rich, see DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
86. The Earned Income Tax Credit has been a battleground for the fairness issue
for some time. See Shailagh Murray, Tax 'Fairness' Feud Rages On, WALL ST. J., June
11, 2003, at A4. The rhetoric accompanying this fight belies the class warfare lurking
just below its surface. In a regrettable editorial entitled The Non-Taxpaying Class, the
Wall Street Journal labeled as "lucky duckies" those taxpayers whose income was so
low after adjustments and tax credits that they owed no federal income tax. Editorial,
The Non-Taxpaying Class, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2002, at A20. Shortly thereafter, Paul
Krugman in the New York Times, took the Journal to task for having the audacity to
consider the hypothetical taxpayer earning $12,000 to be a "lucky duck." The Journal
had focused solely on federal income taxes and had ignored the fact that this low
income earner had paid about 20% of his income in payroll taxes. Paul Krugman, Hey,
Lucky Duckies!, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A3l.
87. There are basically three ways a rate structure could be established:
progressively, where the ratio of tax liability to tax base increases as tax base
increases; proportionally, where the tax liability to tax base ratio is constant as tax
base increases; and regressively, where tax liability to tax base ratio decreases as tax
base increases. See generally RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PuBLIC FINANCE
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revenue needs and tax base capacity, the tax rate structure is a value
judgment on the part of policy makers informed more by philosophy
than by economics. 88 Progressivity has been incorporated into the
federal income tax since the original act in 1913. 89 Of course,
progressive tax rates are not the only option available. True flat tax
proposals are proportional in nature,90 while the VAT and sales tax
proposals are likely to have a regressive tax incidence. 91
In other words, vertical equity says that an individual with a
larger income should pay an appropriate amount more in taxes than
an individual with a smaller income. 92 Vertical equity is a more
subjective concept than horizontal equity, since it involves the
comparison of ability to pay between taxpayers with different
amounts of resources. Consequently, no one notion of vertical equity
enjoys universal support. 93 Flat tax proponents claim to support the
idea of vertical equity by focusing not on the percentage of tax paid,
303 (2d ed. 1996) (providing definitions of progressive, proportional and regressive tax
incidence).
88. For an explicit application of philosophy to the problem of tax rate structure,
compare Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700
(1999) (using John Locke's theory of property to support a progressive tax rate
structure) with Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean
Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8 (2001) (using
Locke's philosophy to justify a consumption tax).
89. See Bank, supra note 3, at 397 (noting that the 1913 income tax instituted
"mildly progressive income tax rates" but moved the overall tax burden toward
proportionality and away from regressivity).
90. See John F. Coverdale, Comment, The Flat Tax is Not a Fair Tax, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 288-89 (1996) (criticizing flat tax claims of fairness on the grounds
that it is not fair to tax everyone at the same rate due to the decreasing marginal
utility of money).
91. Gerald P. Moran, Tax Amnesty: An Old Debate as Viewed from Current Public
Choices, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 307, 313 n.18 (1993).
92. In one sense, vertical equity is the embodiment of one of the two (sometimes
competing) general guiding principles in tax incidence-ability to pay versus payment
for benefit received. See PAUL SAMUELSON, Economic Role of Government: Federal
Taxation and Local Finance, in ECONOMICS 163, 164-65 (10th ed. 1976), reprinted in
POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 2, 3 (Philip F. Postlewaite ed., 1980)
(noting the general guiding principles of tax policy-taxes should be paid by those who
enjoy the benefit from the publicly provided goods and services and people should be
taxed in a way that the burden is spread out as equitably as possible and everyone
bears an appropriate level of sacrifice).
93. See HALL & RABuSHKA, supra note 15, at 28 (criticizing the idea of vertical
equity as an intellectual construct invented by "politicians and intellectuals" to justify
redistribution of income to attain egalitarian social goals at the expense of "individual
freedom and self-reliance"); Robert P. Strauss, The Effects of a Flat Federal
Consumption Tax on the States, 88 NAT'L TAX AsS'N !'ROC. 10, 13 (1995) ( "The 'proper'
degree of vertical equity achieved through progressivity is typically described as a
value judgment, which honorable people can disagree about and which we expect the
political process to adjudicate.").
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but rather on the differences in the absolute dollar amount of taxes
paid. In their view, the rich pay more than the less aflluent in
absolute dollar terms and that should satisfy concerns about vertical
equity.
Part of the difficulty of assessing the federal taxation scheme on
the grounds of vertical equity stems from a failure to agree on exactly
what should be considered in the tax burden when assessing
progressivity, proportionality, and regressivity. In our present tax
system, studies have historically shown that the federal income tax
has some degree of progressivity, but when combined with state and
local levels of taxation the aggregate tax burden is roughly
proportionaP' State and local taxes such as sales and property taxes,
are notoriously regressive, but their regressive aspect is balanced out
by the progressivity of the federal income tax. If the primary federal
tax were shifted to a less progressive structure, a proportional
structure, or even a regressive structure, the over-all tax burden
would be skewed toward regressivity.95
Therefore, from the equity perspective, a flat rate tax would
preserve horizontal equity, as would the VAT and the sales tax, but
the USA or Armey proposals would not, since taxpayers in similar
situations will not be treated similarly. As far as vertical equity is
concerned, however, adoption of any of the tax reform plans would
require a redefinition of that concept as it has been traditionally
understood.

94. See DON FULLERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX
BURDEN? 5-6 (1993) (building on the tradition of earlier studies and concluding that
income tax, even after 1986 changes, remains progressive, even over a lifetime,
whereas sales and excise taxes are regressive, and taxes on capital, while progressive,
affect wealthy and poor more than middle income over a lifetime); JOSEPH A.
PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-1985? 10 (1985) (concluding that, depending on
the assumptions employed, the overall tax burden in the United States is either
moderately progressive or slightly regressive, and noting that overall progressivity
declines from 1966 to 1985 due to the increased importance of the payroll tax); JOSEPH
A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN A. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 62 (1974) (fmding
federal tax burden to be clearly progressive and overall burden roughly proportional).
95. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects ofFundamental Tax Revisions,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1419 (1996) (analyzing the anticipated tax incidence of the tax
proposals and finding a regressive impact). But see Joseph Bankman & Barbara H.
Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 561-65
(1998) (viewing distributional effects of a shift to a consumption tax through a lifecycle
perspective, and noting that, although the tax incidence remains regressive, the
regressivity fades significantly).
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Economic Efficiency

Efficiency is often advanced as a goal of tax policy.96 In practice,
the public policy debate carried on under the heading of "efficiency"
centers on the idea that taxes should interfere as little as possible
with the values of resources in the marketplace. 97 Taxes tend to
reduce efficiency in the economy because they distort the price
mechanism. The price paid by a consumer will exceed the price
received by the seller. Consequently, the imposition of a tax creates a
dead weight 10ss.98
Although tax policy should strive to be efficient and not to
interfere with market choices, all taxes are inherently inefficient
since they invariably affect choices in the marketplace. 99 Sometimes
the distortion caused by the imposition of a tax creates an inequity,
and policy makers must choose between pursuing the goal of equity
or the goal of efficiency.loo The most obvious cases where equity and
efficiency are compromised is in the situation where Congress allows

96. See Zolt, supra note 82, at 43 (noting that the idea of "efficiency" in the
taxation area means "different things to different people"-it could stand for the idea
that taxes should interfere in the market as little as possible, or that taxes should
attempt to correct market failures, or "it could mean reducing or removing taxes" to
bolster economic growth).
97. See FISHER, supra note 87, at 303-04 (defining the concept).
98. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 318-22
(1989) (describing the impact of a tax on buyers and sellers).
99. These effects can be quite deeply embedded and insidious, as in the way the
tax code plays into traditional gender roles. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and
Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2033
36 (1996) (describing the effect of certain aspects of the current income tax, such as
joint filing and the level of marginal rates in the context of how those attributes affect
women). Some scholars would maintain that the appearance of neutrality is illusory.
See TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (providing
an anthology of critical tax theory scholarship that points out that, despite the law's
claim to objectivity, it has a continuing impact on traditionally subordinated groups
along gender, racial, and economic lines). Similarly, when tax law makes contributions
to churches tax deductible, it gets into messy choices implicating the First
Amendment. See generally Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause,
49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971 (1999), Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God
Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the
Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000).
100. See Emanuel S. Burstein, Deductions, Credits, Exemptions, and Exclusions in
the Federal Income Tax System: A Discussion of Public Policy Issues, in 7 STUDIES IN
TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS-A COMPENDIUM 68, 74 (1983)
(noting the need of policy makers to balance inequity and costs against benefits). But
see Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency / Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501 (1997) (arguing that the traditional distinction between
"equity" and "efficiency" is a false dichotomy because they overlap substantially and
the content given to those terms is necessarily informed by value judgments of the
analyst).
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tax deductions, exemptions, credits, or exclusions. In a situation
where a tax expenditure exists, economic efficiency suffers and the
tax burden is shifted from those who can take advantage to those
who can not. The intuitive response to the problem created by tax
expenditures is to broaden the tax base by eliminating tax
preferences.
Relatively high tax rates can create economic inefficiencies as
well. Lower tax rates in general reduce inefficiencies, although, in
any given situation, it is difficult to determine exactly how economic
behavior will change in response to a given change in tax law. lOl
Proponents of radical tax reform often make the case that
fundamental change in the tax system is needed in order to boost the
very low level of household saving in the United States and thereby
help our economy generally.102 Past experiments with tax-based
saving incentives, however, have not had a strong track record in
demonstrating the value of tax policy as a tool for stimulating
widespread consumer-level savings. 103

101. For example, it is sometimes thought that high marginal rates are a
disincentive to work, but it is not clear how lowering the marginal rates would affect a
worker's consumption of leisure. In theoretical terms, the change in tax liability
(income effect) and the change in marginal tax rate (substitution effect) would give
individuals opposing incentives, one to work more, the other to consume more leisure.
A simple example illustrates the predicament. Consider the case of a high-income, self
employed professional who can choose to divide his time between working and
vacationing as he pleases, A flat rate tax is imposed and his marginal rate plummets
from the current highest rate of 38.6% to, say, 17%, and he receives a tax cut of
$20,000. He is faced with a choice: should he work more to take advantage of his
higher after-tax wage, or should he use his extra $20,000-plus to fmance longer and
more extravagant vacations? Analysts generally conclude that these two opposing
forces nearly cancel out each other in the general economy, at least in the male labor
market. There may be distorting income effects for the female workforce, however,
that make a progressive tax more inefficient than a proportional tax. See Jerry A.
Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27-83 (Henry J.
Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (describing the substitution and income
effects of a tax on income in a theoretical context). Empirical evidence seems to
suggest the relationship between tax rates and hours worked may rest on shaky
grounds. See Gene Koretz, How Tax Cuts Affect the Rich, BuS. WK., Oct. 19, 1998, at
18 (describing a study by economists at Johns Hopkins and Purdue that found no
increase in work time of highly compensated men after the significant marginal rate
cuts of the 1986 Tax Act, probably because they were already working as much as they
could already).
102. See, e.g., Bill Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX
REFORM, supra note 25, at 3, 4.
103. See Richard H. Thaler, How to Get Real People to Save, in PERSONAL SAVING,
CONSUMPrION, & TAX POLICY 143-44 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1992).
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Another boon to efficiency claimed by proponents of flat taxes
would be a reduction in the activity of the underground economy.104
Others counter that such claims are perhaps too optimistic and note
that participants in the underground economy will still have
incentives to avoid taxes even after a major tax reform. lOS Given that
much of the underground economy is engaged in illegal activities or
results from intentional evasion of the tax system, it seems unlikely
that the participants in the underground economy will come clean
just because the tax system changes.lOG To the extent the
underground economy includes people who just do not pay their taxes
because they believe the tax system is illegitimate, however, radical
reform may result in increased voluntary compliance. 107

C. Simplicity.
Simplicity has always been a goal of tax policy,108 but over the
years it has proved elusive. l09 Even judges and tax professionals can
become exasperated by the intricate cross-references and layering of
tax provisions. lIo Sensing the public's frustration with a complicated

104. See Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax, in FAIRNESS AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX, supra note 59, at 96, 99 (noting among other things, his
belief that a flat tax will pick up members of the underground economy).
105. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM 47 (1997) (noting the likely persistence of the
underground economy because "[aln imbalance would continue to exist in the way
taxes treat unreported and reported economic activities.").
106. See Barry Molefsky, America's Underground Economy, in 6 STUDIES IN
TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS-A COMPENDIUM 294, 294 (1982)
(describing the underground economy and noting that the participants therein either
are engaged in illegal activity, intentionally fail to report income, or avoid income
taxation through non-cash transactions that should be, but often are not, reported).
107. Taxpayers in the United States are remarkably conscientious about paying
taxes voluntarily. The phenomenon of U.S. tax compliance is likely the result of a well
established social norm. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The
Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000).
108. Even in the halcyon days of 1923, the Supreme Court voiced frustration at the
apparent illogic of the tax code: "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends."
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506,521-22 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring).
109. Even when the government sets out to examine the problem of simplification,
as it did in 2001 when the Joint Committee on Taxation presented a study on the
topic, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PuRSUANT
TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print 2001),
the political realities of how to frame the problem, and what to suggest as solutions,
cloud the issue to the point where analysis is lost. For a critique of the government's
effort at studying simplification, see Mark E. Erwin, A Policy Analysis and Critique of
the Joint Committee on Taxation's Simplification Study, 56 TAX LAW. 625 (2003).
110. See Peter L. Faber, Complexity in the Tax Laws and Tax Reform: A Modern
Fable, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 42 (1977) (providing an entertaining example of the infuriating
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tax code, advocates of major tax reform have used a desire to simplify
the law as one of their major rallying cries. l l l Simplicity is desirable
in order to minimize the costs of compliance and to preserve the
perception of equity.ll2 Yet under a legislative scheme of any
sophistication, including our current system of income taxation, there
are limits on how simple a law can be.1I3 Defining a key idea like
"income," for example, can be a rather vexing exercise,114 requiring a
voluminous set of regulations to describe eligibility for all of the
deductions, exclusions, exemptions, and credits involved in
determining the tax base. In a world where scholars argue whether
legal rules are determinate, complexity is bound to expand as
lawmakers attempt to narrow down the range of possible
interpretations for a given rule.1I5 Some scholars suggest that
complexity is inevitable and ultimately beneficial.1I6
complexity of tax code cross references from a practitioner's point of view); Farley P.
Katz, The Infernal Revenue Code, 50 TAX LAW. 617 (1997) (providing a handy
compendium of colorful language from court opinions lamenting the damning
complexity of income tax provisions); Fowler W. Martin, IRS Workers Can't Answer
Tax Questions: Taxpayers Seeking Help Often Received Wrong Advice, WALL ST. J.,
May 14, 2001, at B7 (reporting on an audit by the Inspector General of the IRS of the
Service's 500 Taxpayer Assistance Centers which found that the IRS personnel often
gave erroneous advice).
111. Some observers even suggest that the extremely complicated provisions of the
1997 Tax Act were intentionally made as convoluted as possible in order to build
public support for reform. See Mike McNamee, Now That We've Made Taxes More
Complex, Let's Simplify Them, Bus. WK., Sept. I, 1997, at 45; Tom Herman, Tax
Report, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,1997, at AI.
112. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 134 (1996) (noting that excess complexity
affects all taxpayers for two reasons: unsophisticated taxpayers suspect that
sophisticated taxpayers are taking advantage of loopholes, thereby skewing equity,
and high tax compliance costs are passed along to everyone as higher prices).
113. Scholars have studied the problem of complexity from a number of different
angles. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (using economic theory to examine the optimal level of
complexity in light of costs on actors of dealing with the complexity); see also Eric
Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997)
(applying computational complexity theory to legal rules to get a perspective on the
complexity of rules as a function of the size of the case they apply to).
114. For a provocative article about why the definition of "income" matters in the
larger debate about radical tax reform, see Eric M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the
Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes, n 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1057, 1061
(2001) (noting that the Constitution prohibits the federal government from levying
unapportioned direct taxes on the People except in the case permitted by the Sixteenth
Amendment-taxes on incomes).
115. For a general discussion of the interaction among indeterminacy of rules and
the complexity and fairness of the tax system, see John A. Miller, Indeterminacy,
Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993). That is not to say that precise rules are always the best rules;
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Nevertheless, critics of the current system frequently make
rhetorical use of the physical size of the collected tax-related
legislation, regulation, instructions, and guidance, as if the sheer
volume of the material is what makes the tax law complicated.l17 Yet
somewhat counterintutitively, the large volume of tax-related legal
material may actually make taxes simpler. 1lS Conventional wisdom
also holds that more complex provisions promote the goal of fairness
by allowing the law to be tailored to fit specific family situations. ll9
The policy decision oftrading off simplicity for fairness is in the end a
normative decision informed by individual values. 12o Some amount of
complexity seems inevitable in order to attain an acceptable level of
accuracy in measuring the tax base. l2l Conservatives would generally
find that the fine tuning is not worth the cost of the complexity.122
depending on the goals of the given regulatory scheme, vague rules may serve better.
See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999); see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of
Limits and the Desired Distribution of Conducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2000).
116. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22
VA. TAX REV. 645, 650-53 (2003) (arguing that (1) complexity is "either inevitable or
net beneficial" in that it is a tradeoff for achieving goals of equity or efficiency; (2) the
alleged harms from complexity are anecdotal, at best; (3) proposed remedies to
complexity are themselves complex or they over-correct the problem; and (4) simplicity
itself is nothing special, but should be understood as being an adjunct to the goals of
efficiency and equity).
117. Rep. Chabot of Ohio, for instance, has made the point that the tax code is "four
times the length of the Bible." 146 CONGo REC. H2128 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2000).
118. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 130 ("In fact, having a detailed set
of rules could make things simpler, to the extent it clears up gray areas in the tax
law."); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1974), reprinted in POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION, supra note 92, at 356
(noting that simple provisions often leave taxpayers to second-guess the IRS or a court
about how a provision will be applied, while intricate, even complicated, provisions
help taxpayers comply with the law and make safe decisions).
119. See Joel Slemrod, Which Is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?, in
ECONOMIC EFFECI'S OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 59, at 355, 380 ("Some
complexity buys the capacity to fine-tune tax liability-to 'personalize' it-according to
family characteristics.").
120. The alternative minimum tax, a notoriously complicated area of tax law, is an
attempt to achieve horizontal equity. Reasonable minds can differ over whether the
gains in equity are worth the added complexity. See Shailagh Murray, Firestorm
Looms on Minimum Tax, WALL ST. J., July 1,2003, at A4.
121. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 61, 61 (1998) (examining the trade-off between accuracy and complexity, taking
into account compliance costs and the provision of appropriate incentives for taxpayers
to acquire the information necessary to comply with the law).
122. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 39 (1995).
Epstein states:
The only question for the legal system is how it will make its errors, not
whether it will make them. Simple rules are adopted by people who
acknowledge that possibility of error up front, and then seek to minimize it
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Philosophical issues of complexity aside, however, as a practical
matter, for most taxpayers the portion of the current law that applies
to their situation is not all that complex. 123 The Internal Revenue
Service has made great strides to simplify taxpayer filing with
streamlined forms, detailed instructions, and simple tax tables. In
2000, approximately 40% of all taxpayers filed one of the abbreviated
forms.124 Despite the incredibly simple directions and requirements
for filling out these simple forms, however, over 4.4% of the form
1040EZ filers and over 14.5% of the form 1040A filers submitted
returns that included a paid preparer's signature. 125 The need for
professional assistance could be the result of a complex tax code, but
the forms at issue here are truly simple. 126 A better explanation is
that most taxpayers have a very modest complexity horizon127 when it
comes to taxation issues. 128 That many Americans fmd their taxes
complicated 129 should come as no surprise in light of the terrifyingly
high number of Americans who have trouble reading a bus
in practice. Complex rules are for those who have an unattainable vision of
perfection.
[d.

123. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 130 (suggesting that most
taxpayers do not spend much time on their taxes).
124. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 22 SOl BULLETIN 153 (Winter 2002-2003)
(providing table with data on individual returns showing that, of the 129,373,500 total
returns ftled in 2000,28,826,589 were made on form 1040A and 21,700,809 were made
on form 1040EZ).
125. [d. at 153, 194 (providing data on returns ftled in 2000 by type of form and
number of returns that included a paid preparer's signature).
126. Although there is scant data to verifY the trend, the high number of paid
preparers on simple returns might be evidence that many low-income taxpayers are
availing themselves oftax refund lending schemes offered by paid preparers.
127. See JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 120-25
(1995) (discussing the idea of a complexity horizon). Paulos defines the complexity
horizon as being the limit of a person's comprehension beyond which "social laws,
events, and regularities are so complex as to be unfathomable, seemingly random.
Applied loosely and casually, the term is useful in referring to discriminations that are
impossibly subtle for a given group of people at a given point in time." [d. at 120.
128. Consider, for example, that the General Accounting Office found that about
510,000 federal income tax ftlers in 1998 elected the standard deduction instead of
itemizing their deductions, even though they had mortgage interest deductions that
exceeded the standard deduction. The average overpayment amount was $610. See
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-01-529, TAX
DEDUCTIONS: ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAy HAVE OVERPAID FEDERAL TAXES BY
NOT ITEMIZING 2 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov.
129. In a recent poll conducted by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
together with NPR and the Kaiser Family Foundation, eighty-seven percent of
respondents considered the current federal income tax system to be either "very
complex" or "somewhat complex." National Public RadiolKaiser Family
FoundationlKennedy School of Government, National Survey of Americans' Views on
Taxes (April 26, 2003), at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/polls/taxes2003/index.html.
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schedule. 130 It is somewhat surprising that more filers do not require
assistance. 131
Nevertheless, even if the complexity argument does not fit the
facts as well as its proponents would like it to, a simpler system
might cost less to comply with. The cost of tax compliance includes
the costs of tax record keeping, reporting, and planning along with
more subtle societal costS. 132 Administration of and compliance with
the tax code can be costly and time consuming. In addition to the
costs of compliance, unnecessary complexity eats away at taxpayer
respect for, and voluntary compliance with, the tax law. Complexity
can affect horizontal equity because similarly situated taxpayers may
pay different amounts of tax because they do not share the same
ability to understand the law or get professional tax counseling.
Taxpayers may suspect that complexity is a cover for some to pay
less than others; and this could mean that taxpayers lose faith in the
equity of the tax system. 133 Indeed, it has been suggested that

130. In a startling study by the Department of Education in conjunction with the
Educational Testing Service, more than 26,000 American adults were tested on
practical, every-day matters such as reading newspaper articles, filling in simple
forms, and answering questions involving basic math skills. The test's results were
categorized into five levels of competence. Extrapolating from the test results,
approximately forty to forty-four million Americans perform at the lowest level,
meaning they are unable to calculate the total of a purchase, determine the difference
in price between two items, read a street map, or enter information on a simple form.
It also indicates that an additional fifty million perform at the second-lowest level:
they are unable to answer specific questions about facts in a newspaper article or to
interpret charts summarizing information. With regard to the rest of the competence
levels, the test found that sixty million Americans function with middle-level skills,
and thirty-four to forty million function at the two highest levels. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET
AL, ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA xiii-xv (1993); see Tamara Henry, College-Level
Literacy "Less Than Impressive,» USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al (reporting the
results of an Educational Testing Service study of college-educated adults that found,
among other things, that about half of four-year college educated adults could not read
a bus schedule).
131. The IRS reports that many errors found on tax returns have nothing to do with
the complexity of the tax law but are instead the result of sloppiness or poor reading
and arithmetic skills. Karen Hube, IRS Has a Gripe Too: Sloppy Taxpayers, WALL ST.
J., May 13, 1999, at C1.
132. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 357 (1994) ("The present system of
taxation has contributed much to the bureaucratization of modern life and the
increased regulation of economic life, both for individuals as well as businesses."); see
also JAMES L. PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: THE BURDENS OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 127-48
(1993) (detailing a long list of "[elmotional, [mloral, and [clultural [closts" of the
current tax system, including the use of coercion, invasion of privacy, abuse of power,
infringement of freedom of speech, and violation of conscience).
133. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Comments to Henry J. Aaron, Lessons for Tax
Reform, in Do TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 332,
333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) (opining that, before the 1986 Tax Act, the proliferation of
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lawmakers prefer a complex tax code because intricate prOVISIOns
allow them to raise taxes on some groups and lower taxes on other
groups without political accountability!34
Proponents of flat rate taxes portray them as the ultimate in tax
simplification. 13s While it is likely that the elimination of certain tax
expenditures and some other aspects of the new proposals will result
in some simplification, similar simplicity gains could be achieved
through reform of the existing tax scheme. 13s Enactment of the new
tax plans would bring new complexity problems. For example, by
taxing income that is now exempt, tax compliance will become more
complicated. Paying taxes on the interest from municipal bonds as
contemplated under the flattened tax proposal would entail a whole
new layer of bureaucracy at the federal level to keep track of bond
issues and to make sure they are reported. The simplicity gains
under the flattened tax from switching to an exemption-free tax base
would in all likelihood be offset, if not outweighed, by administrative
headaches of keeping track of the newly taxable aspects of the
broadened tax base, such as the interest on municipal bonds.
The claim by some that tax returns would be simplified enough
to fit on a postcard is without a doubt exaggerated. 137 The space on
the current return for taxpayer's name, address and other clerical
information exceeds the area of a five inch by eight inch postcard. A
flat tax would not eliminate the need for this information. While
repeal of tax expenditures would eliminate some lines, the inclusion
of new types of income would add lines. Much of the information
required on the forms is there so the IRS can check compliance
without a full-scale audit. Elimination of items such as dividend and

tax preferences and tax shelters created the impression that the tax system was unfair
and that the 1986 Tax Act's curtailment of tax preferences and tough anti-shelter
provisions "were crucial for improving the perception of fairness").
134. Robert L. Bartley, Time for HOTU!sty in Taxation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at
A21 ("[A] complex tax code is political camouflage.").
135. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tax: Is It Unique?,
14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 283 (1997) (describing the simplifying aspects of the
HalllRabushka style of flat taxes and a brief summary of the other proposals and
contrasting them with the limits of simplification under traditional income tax
reform).
136. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and
Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459 (1993)
(proposing changes to the existing tax code that would simplify its application); Joseph
A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and FairTU!ss: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax
Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61 (1996) (detailing four specific reform programs within the
context of the existing income tax that could have dramatic simplification gains for the
system).
137. For a humorous take on what that postcard-sized return might look like, see
Bruce McCall, Flat Tax Return, THE NEW YORKER, April 8, 1996, at 110.
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interest income would make tax enforcement more costly and would
represent a gain for simplicity at a cost for efficiency.
Finally, the transition from our present tax scheme to a new
regime will not be simple. No matter how "simple" a new tax regime
may appear in the abstract, we must keep in mind that it will be
interpreted by fallible judges who sometimes get confused or add
complexities of their own.13S Indeed, the now-maligned income tax
code started out just fourteen pages long and its application was
profoundly shaped by judicial decisions applying that "simple"
statute to devilishly detailed practical situations. 139 The concepts
developed under the income tax code are likely to continue to guide
judicial interpretations of any new tax plans because all of the reform
proposals make extensive use of well-established tax terms rooted in
the distinctions arising under present law. 14D

D. Stability
A sudden, drastic change in the tax base and tax rates would
wreak havoc in all areas of the economy, and especially in the state
and local government sector.141 The tax code is currently a major
consideration for all actors in the economy, be they investors deciding
what to invest in, or local government finance officers deciding
whether to borrow or tax to fund a particular project. Given that
virtually all actors in the economy base their decisions at least partly
on tax considerations, many people will be hurt economically if the
tax treatment of their actions changes suddenly.142
138. See generally Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal
Incoherence, 48 HAsTINGS L.J. 771 (1997) (discussing the challenges of coherent and
consistent judicial interpretation of statutory provisions using tax decisions involving
the same statutory provision interpreted with three different techniques).
139. See Pollack, supra note 132, at 322-330 (providing a concise history of the
income tax code from its inception through World War n.
140. See Lester B. Snyder and Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the
Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other
Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 4-5 (1996) ("Much of what has been written
to date on the proposed consumption tax legislation presumes Congress will be writing
on a clean slate. However, many of the concepts referred to in the consumption tax
bills borrow heavily from current income tax law.... By retaining these distinctions in
the proposed reforms, we create a new generation of complexity ....").
141. See Christopher Farrell, A Flat Tax is Flat-Out Risky, Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 1996,
at 80 ("The gains could be easily dwarfed by wrenching business and household
upheavals as America shifts to a new tax code.").
142. For example, the value of tax exempt obligations decreases based on changes in
the tax law, affecting the net worth of the holders of those obligations. For a more
complete discussion of transition dislocations, see generally Ronald A. Pearlman,
Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax Lawyer's Perspective, in
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 59, at 393, 406,
discussing major transition problems such as the fairness to taxpayers nearing
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There has been a spirited debate in academic circles concerning
whether there is a need for transition rules to soften the blow to
taxpayers who made plans under one tax regime only to have those
plans significantly altered by subsequent tax law changes. In the
view of some scholars, such transition rules are economically
wasteful since they amount to insurance policies protecting vested
taxpayers against the repeal of tax preferences. 143 Because these
insurance policies are funded by the public, the beneficiaries of the
insurance have no incentive to respond to changing political and
economic realities. Others have argued that forswearing transition
rules will only make the situation worse by increasing political
maneuvering and increasing the cost of tax preferences to the
government to compensate beneficiaries for the lack of
grandfathering protection. l44 It may be that the transition rules are
irrelevant as a matter of economics or finance and that the real test
for transitional relief is a political one. 145 One thing is certain: if the
current tax scheme is repealed, the groups that benefited from that
system will "clamor for political relief."146
Regardless of the outcome of the debate about what to do when
the tax law changes, it nevertheless remains true that, all things
being equal, stability ordinarily is a goal of tax policy. Although there
have been many changes to the income tax code over the years, the
changes have occurred within the context of a familiar system.
retirement in switching to a consumption based tax system just as they are about to
become consumers instead of wage earners and radically changing the plans made by
taxpayers in reliance on the existing tax rules. But such a transition would not be
beyond the ingenuity of policymakers. See Joseph Bankman, The Engler-Krwll
Consumption Tax Proposal: What Transition Rule Does Fairness (or Politics) Require?,
56 SMU L. REV. 83 (2003); Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the
Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53 (2003).
143. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 65 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Ecorwmic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 533-36 (1986).
144. See generally Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and
the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996); J. Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to
Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989). But see HJALMAR BOEHM &
MICHAEL FUNKE, OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES UNDER DEMAND AND TAX
UNCERTAINTY (CESifo, Working Paper Series No. 311, 2000) (rmding that investment
is not affected by the degree of tax policy uncertainty), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=263519.
145. See Eric Chason, The Economic Ambiguity (and Possible Irrelevance) of Tax
Transition Rules, 22 VA. TAX REV. 615, 618 (2003) (setting forth the case that the
choice of tax-transition rules is "generally irrelevant from an efficiency or revenue
perspective").
146. See Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U.
Cm. L. REV. 319, 321 (2003) (describing some of the political battles that may be
anticipated if the income tax is repealed).
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Wholesale reform of the entire taxation system has no modern
precedent in the United States. It would be very difficult to predict
the disruption that the transition would engender, but even
supporters of flat tax plans admit there would be significant
instability during the transition. 147 Even after the transition,
however, the new flat taxes would be subject to tinkering the same
way income taxes currently are. It will be hard to realize any benefits
from any plan if the taxation scheme is not left in place long enough
for the changes brought about by the new regime to take root.l4S
The current tax code already changes with fair regularity, and
we should expect a new tax code to require some fine-tuning that will
result in technical changes for a few years after enactment. Given the
fundamental nature of the reforms being proposed, it is unlikely that
policy makers will get all the details of the new tax regime right on
the first try. Even without technical adjustments, it is merely the
nature of our political process that Congress will be unable to resist
the temptation to tinker with the tax code regardless of the tax
base. 149
Besides the importance of stable tax policy to investment
planning, the tax system should act as a stabilizing influence on the
economy during times of economic fluctuation. In the economy at
large, the income tax structure is responsible for countering swings
in the business cycle. In an upturn of the economy, caused by either
real economic growth or inflation, the income tax automatically
produces higher revenue yields without lag time or a governmental
discretionary act, such as a reassessment of property, and collects
less in a downturn number. In this way, the government extracts
more money during times of prosperity and less in recessionary times
to lessen the possibility of the economy swinging out of controI,1so A
consumption tax is less likely to be as robust an automatic stabilizer
because the revenue stream produced by the tax will be much "more
stable over the business cycle. mS1
147. See McLure, supra note 135, at 294 ("[Tlransition from the current income tax
to the flat tax would inevitably be complicated.").
148. See The Flat Tax: "Nutty" It's Not, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at A14 (Gary
Becker opining that the long term benefits of a flat tax will not be achieved unless the
tax structure is stable over time).
149. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 219 (voicing the opinion that Congress will
inevitably tinker with and experiment with the tax system to meet various economic,
social, or other goals).
150. See PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 9-20 (discussing the automatic stabilization
effect of the income tax).
151. See JAMES M. BICKLEY, FLAT TAX: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED POLICY ISSUES
RELEVANT TO THE HALL-RABUSHKA PROPOSAL 15-16 (Cong. Research Serv., Working
Paper No. 96-428E, 1996) (noting the expected role a flat tax would play in the
stabilization function).
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This attribute of cycle-countering causes the revenue yields of
the income tax to be quite volatile. While it lends stability to the
economy in general, the volatile yields of the progressive tax make
fiscal planning in the public sector a more difficult task. The revenue
yield from the HalllRabushka inspired reform proposals potentially
will be much more reliable and will have the benefit of making fiscal
planning easier/52 even ifits macroeconomic stabilizing effect is less.
The preceding discussion shows that the tax reform proposals
would fail to achieve the traditional goals of tax policy. If the
negative impact on municipal finance that would result from
adoption of the reform proposals is as obvious as it seems, then the
proponents are either willfully blind to the problems their bills could
create or they are in fact promoting these proposals for reasons other
than the attainment of the traditional tax policy goals. An
alternative explanation for promoting radical tax reform may be
found in the political philosophy Of conservatism.

IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR RADICAL TAX REFORM
As the preceding discussion points out, enactment of any of the

radical tax reform proposals will fail to achieve the policy goals of
vertical equity, efficiency, or stability and will generate adverse
consequences that will outweigh the modest gains to horizontal
equity and simplicity that might result from their enactment. This
policy failure seems fairly likely when examined in light of the
traditional goals of tax policy, yet the sponsors of radical tax reform
continue to promote their plans in the language of fairness,
simplicity, efficiency, and stability. When the rhetoric of reform and
the predictable consequences of the proposals do not add up, one
must wonder if the proponents truly believe what they are saying or
whether there is something else going on. If one looks at the political
ideology of the proponents of radical tax reform, one sees that
something else is going on. Flat tax proponents are really concerned
about one of the most fundamental issues of our political system-the
power of the central government!53
The proponents of radical tax reform are politicians who would
likely describe themselves as "conservative" even though they
certainly are not all cut from the same cloth. 154 The rise of
conservatism has been a major force in American politics in the past

152. See id. at 15.
153. See Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 2348 (discussing the rhetoric of the tax
reform debate: "Behind the economic arguments, however, lurk beliefs about the
extent and nature of government, the right to property, and moral worth.").
154. Representative Gephardt is the exception that proves the rule. He is certainly
more "liberal" than the other would-be tax reformers.
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twenty years, although exactly what conservatism is remains hard to
define with precision. Given all of the internal contradictions and
differences of opinion among political actors who refer to themselves
or are classified by others as "conservative," it would probably be
incorrect to refer to American conservatism as an "ideology.m55
Nevertheless, there are several core beliefs in the conservative
tradition, and, by urging the implementation of sweeping changes in
federal tax law, conservative legislators are seeking to advance two
important conservative goals: (1) elimination of the opportunity for
the federal government to engage in what they consider to be
illegitimate "social engineering" through the use of tax expenditures
contained in the tax code; and (2) changing the way taxes are raised
in order to make the total tax burden more visible to state and local
taxpayers in hopes that the citizens will rebel against taxes generally
and reduce the taxes over which they have the most control. The
traditional tax policy goals discussed earlier in this Article are only
window dressing for these real objectives. I56
One might fairly respond, however, that the distinction between
the putative goals of tax policy (i.e., efficiency, equity, simplicity, and
stability) and the two real goals (reduction of social engineering and
a devolution of taxes to the local level) may not be such an airtight
distinction. One might maintain that the putative and the real goals
are more intimately intertwined than suggested and indeed are
means to one another, or are sub-species of one another. For
155. Exactly what constitutes a conservative has been the subject of much debate.
See SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 9-11 (1995) (identifying four broad movements that are
often referred to as being part of the "Right": (1) the anticommunists, (2) the racist
Right, (3) the Christian Right, and (4) the neoconservatives); CHARLES W. DUNN & J.
DAVID WOODARD, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN AMERICA 28-42 (1996) (noting the
lack of agreement on whether conservatism is an ideology and summarizing the views
of five political philosophers who have attempted to characterize the different types of
contemporary American conservatives). Often libertarians are lumped into the
"conservative" category, although there is certainly much tension between true
libertarians and other brands of conservatism such as, say, moraVreligious
conservatives. For example, it is likely that libertarians would oppose "social
engineering" as an illegitimate infringement of individual freedom in all situations,
whereas moral conservatives might not mind social engineering if it promotes a set of
behaviors in which they believe, while neoconservatives might merely be wary of it,
one way or another. See generally E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS
(1991).
156. Of course, it is not that unusual for politicians to be less than completely
candid about what they hope their legislation will achieve. It is not uncommon for
legislation to be justified in language that has wide acceptance because stating its true
purpose in plain language would fail to attract the political support necessary for
passage. See Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative
Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1327-34 (1994) (discussing the common lack of
candor in the legislative process and providing examples).
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example, a conservative could take the position that, while efficiency
is a value maximized by non-interference with the market, what
motivates defenders of efficiency is the belief that individuals should
make their own choices, and the field of choices should be as
expansive as possible. Taxes interfere with efficiency because they
create obstacles to offering certain products and services that, in
turn, reduce individual choice. It is a small step to argue that the
general objection to social engineering is cut from the same cloth.
What conservatives object to about social engineering is that the
social and political landscape is being altered from above and in a
way (1) that may not reflect the policy choices of the people, and (2)
which, once implemented, narrows the range, or raises the costs, of
available choices. In the end, the conservative argument could be
summed up by saying that the policy imperative for tax efficiency
and the conservative antipathy to federal social engineering are two
different aspects of the conservative belief in the importance of
individual choice.
Such an argument makes sense in the abstract, but, as applied
to the flat tax debate, it falls a bit short. While the four traditional
goals of tax policy get their due in public discussions of radical tax
reform, the opposition to "social engineering" or the promotion of
devolution is not rolled into the discussion of "efficiency." The
efficiency discussion focuses on economics and economic efficiency
rather than on the political values of liberty and personal choice. The
two "real" motivations developed in this Article, while they might be
thought of as subsets of other aspects of conservative thought, are
usually not discussed as such in the public debate and, in fact, are
often omitted from or down played in the policy discussion. This
section will examine the "real" goals in more detail.
A.

Eliminating the Use of Tax Expenditures for "Social
Engineering"

Although conservatism is by no means a uniform ideology, there
are some core foundation principles to which most conservatives
subscribe, including the following: (1) conservatism is more of a world
view than a political agenda; (2) conservatism does not embrace the
notion of "the perfectibility of man" or the attainment of a social
utopia and offers no prescriptive program to solve social problems;
and (3) conservatives believe that change should proceed gradually
and organically within the bounds of existing local institutions, such
as communities, churches, universities, and organizations rather
than through the agency of central government imposing
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theoretically correct rules of socially desirable behavior.I57
Conservatives harbor a deep suspicion of intellectual fashions. They
are much more likely to perceive the time-tested societal traditions
and customs as preferable to radical new ideas. This bias in favor of
established institutions arises because, in the conservative world
view, the intellectual capacity of anyone human being is relatively
slight compared to the sum total of human experience over the
ages. ISS Skepticism of human omniscience brings with it a skepticism
of governmental omniscience because governments are composed of
human beings and all human beings have a limited stock of reason
and wisdom. Because they are skeptical of the capabilities of
government to do a better job in directing human behavior than the
organically evolved social norms and institutions handed down from
history, conservatives oppose attempts by the central government to
engage in "social planning."159
That conservatives distrust government sponsored programs
calculated by policy analysts to bring about socially beneficial change
should not be interpreted to mean that conservatives are opposed to
all change whatsoever. Change is inevitable and even necessary if a
society is to survive and thrive. Conservatives, however, prefer to see
that inevitable change proceed from experience and be as consistent
as possible with tradition, continuity, and social order.I60
Conservatives loath proposed changes to the social order, no matter
how well-reasoned or well-intentioned, that spring from the abstract
intellectual constructs of social planners rather than from the
natural progression of human experience. I61 Indeed, there is a special
epithet conservatives employ to describe government efforts to mold
human behavior: "social engineering. "162
157. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 8-11 (7th rev.
ed. 1986) (discussing the core tenets of conservatism).
158. [d. at 36-37 (quoting Edmund Burke for the proposition that it is better to rely
the "general bank of capital of nations and ages" than on the "private stock of reason"
of an individual).
159. The modern conservative's distrust of central planning owes a great deal to the
work of Friedrich A. Hayek, who warned about the pernicious effects of government
involvement in the economy. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM (1944) (articulating the view that central direction of economic activity
according to a government plan ultimately brings dictatorship and the suppression of
freedom).
160. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 72-76 (1955) (expressing the
idea that stability, continuity, and the restriction of change contribute to a good
society).
161. KIRK, supra note 157, at 9 (noting a profound distrust by conservatives of
"'sophisters, calculators, and economists'" who think they can reinvent society
according to their own designs).
162. Use of the term "social engineering" has not been limited to conservatives,
however. Liberals have co-opted the term to describe the conservatives' pro-family
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Try as one might, it is difficult to find the term "social
engineering" used in anything but a pejorative sense. 163 It is not,
however, difficult to find it used in conjunction with discussions of
federal tax policy.l64 It may not be going too far to suggest that
conservatives see Adam Smith's invisible hand as being guided by
the hand of God acting through the free will of His people. 16s Indeed
some people believe their religious convictions compel them to press
for fundamental tax reform. 166 When government attempts to pervert
the free choices of those people by creating artificial incentives in the
tax code that would not otherwise be present in the free market,
conservatives take it almost as an affront to human dignity.167
agenda. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Family Planning: Social Engineering Tempts the
Right, REASON, Mar. 1998, at 56, at http://reason.com!9803/col.olson.shtml.
163. See, e.g. Betty Freauf, How the Left Turned Some People Right,
NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM, Apr. 12, 2003 (praising the "undying dedication of the
conservatives who continue exposing the truth" in making "'sixties indoctrinated
lefties' ... realize ... [that tlhey had become victims of diabolical social engineering"),
at http://www.newswithviews.com/BettylFreauf20.htm;WesVernon.·Clinton-Era
Social Engineering' Still Plagues the Military, NEwsMAx.COM, Oct. 28, 2003
(criticizing the "double standards between men and women" in the military caused by
"feminist-driven pressure"), at http://www.newsmax.com!archiveslarticlesl2003/10/27/
163539.shtml.
164. See Paul Craig Roberts, A Groundswell is Building: Toss the Tax System, BuS.
WK., May 5, 1997, at 26 ("The function of a tax system is to raise revenues, not to
engineer society."); Sen. John Ashcroft, Tax Relieffor Those Most in Need, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 1996, at A22 (referring to the Clinton administration as "social engineers"
who "tinker with the American peoples' judgment").
165. For an explicit articulation of opposition to tax expenditures on the grounds
they violate God's plan, see RONALD PASQUARIELLO, TAX JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND MORAL
AsPECTS OF AMERICAN TAX POLICY 2, 5 (1985). In the chapter entitled "Christians and
the Tax System," the author notes: "tal second reason for Christian concern about the
tax system is this: Through the tax system, the government encourages certain types
of economic and social behavior." [d. at 2. The author goes on to draw the following
lesson from scripture:
The lesson of Genesis is this: To be human, to be made in the image of the
Creator, is to be endowed with the ability to give shape to the world, to have
the ability to participate fully in one's society, to have one's voice heard, to
make a difference .... If this is what we are to be, shapers of the economic
and social reality of the world, and if indeed this is what the tax system does,
then we must be involved with the tax system as a Christian duty....
Whatever distortions it contains of essentially Christian values, are the
product of our intention or of our indifference. In either case, we have a
responsibility[,l ... by virtue of the fact that we are responsible ... to assure
that the tax system helps deliver ajust, sustainable and participatory world.
[d. at 5.
166. See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judea
Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing for more vertical equity in
Alabama's tax scheme based on Jesus' teachings about helping the disadvantaged).
167. See JOSEPH J. JACOBS, THE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVE: SEEKING
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 199,209 (1996) {"The assumption that human
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Although they obviously engender strong opposition on
philosophical grounds, tax incentives have long been used as an
instrument to induce socially desirable activities in the general
economy or to provide tax subsidies or penalties to correct market
failures. 16s Although the public typically refers to these tax incentives
as "loopholes," tax policy analysts call them "tax expenditures.'H69 Tax
expenditures have been defended on the grounds that they promote
employment, economic growth, and equity, support worthwhile
institutions, and assist state and local governments. 170 Proponents
also insist that government intervention in the economy is justified
when there is a perceived failure of the private market to allocate
resources efficiently.l7l In addition, advocates urge, in some cases,
there are advantages to providing subsidies through the income tax
instead of providing an explicit subsidy through a government agency
because the tax incentive can be administered through the tax
system, which is already in place and which reaches virtually all of
the American public.
While tax expenditures can be defended on policy grounds, they
always entail a trade-off of equity and/or efficiency in the tax system,
and sometimes they do not achieve the goals they were designed to
address. 172 There is a large literature criticizing tax expenditures for
behavior, or more precisely human happiness and welfare, can be reduced to a
mathematical or engineering construct denigrates the wonderful diversity of human
beings.... There is ... a demonstrably superior judge to answer all these questions
[about allocating resources): Free markets and free choice. There is also a by-product
to free choice in a free market--dignity."}.
168. For a thoughtful treatment of an appropriate role for tax expenditures, see
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes,
49 UCLA L. REV. 685 (2002).
169. Tax expenditures are made through the federal individual income tax by way
of the exclusion, exemption, or deferral of certain types of income from taxation, a
preferential rate on certain types of income, or a deduction or tax credit for certain
selected costs. See Nonna A. Noto, Tax Expenditures: The Link Between Economic
Intent and the Distribution of Benefits Among High, Middle, and Low Income Groups,
in 5 STUDIES IN TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECT&-A COMPENDIUM
59, 60 (Fund for Public Policy Research ed., 1981) (noting the forms of tax
expenditure).
170. Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Case for Tax Loopholes, in A NEW TAX
STRUCTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES 16, 25 (David H. Skadden ed. 1978) (noting these
rationales for tax expenditures).
171. See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Policy and Spillover Effects: The Use of
Tax Provisions to Induce Socially Desirable Activities, in 5 STUDIES IN TAXATION,
PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECT&-A COMPENDIUM 50 (Fund For Public Policy
Research ed., 1981) (stating that examples of tax expenditures that address market
failures or attempt to correct externalities have included pollution control and historic
preservation).
172. See Rochelle Sharpe, Great Expectations: A Tax Credit Designed to Spur Hiring
Seems Promising-at First, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1997, at Al (reporting on businesses'
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a number of shortcomings. 173 In general, however, tax expenditures
tend to raise problems with equity174 and efficiency.175
Despite the economic and policy arguments that can and have
been made against tax expenditures, when conservative politicians
voice their support for tax reform, the case for eliminating tax
expenditures boils down to the language of social engineering. A
sampling of rhetoric from the Congressional Record bears this out:
~
Rep. McCrery, Republican of Louisiana, speaking III
favor of broad marginal rate tax cuts:
[U]nlike the tax policy of the pnor [Clinton]
administration, marginal rate cuts do not
discriminate. They do not favor only individuals
engaging in activities deemed worthy. They do not
experience with a tax incentive designed to motivate the hiring of welfare recipients
and finding that the red tape of qualifying for the incentive often outweighed the
benefit provided).
173. For the classic assault on tax expenditures, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970) (attacking tax expenditures on
the grounds that they reward taxpayers for doing what they would have done anyway,
benefit the wealthy, distort the market, and contribute to high tax rates by eroding the
tax base); see also CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that tax
expenditures have created a "hidden" welfare state that is more difficult to monitor
and control than the one that is administered through direct government programs);
MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?: THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND
TAXATION (1999) (raising concerns about political accountability when the tax system
is used to regulate behavior instead of the more transparent method of raising money
and promulgating legislation).
174. With regard to equity, it is sometimes said that tax expenditures benefit the
wealthy at the expense of the poor. Empirical evidence fails to support that idea,
however. See Noto, supra note 169, at 61-64. A study examined tax expenditures for
the fiscal year 1978 in four broad categories: investment, consumption, employment,
and need. Id. at 61. The investments tax expenditure category included items such as
the investment tax credit, depreciation, depletion allowances, capital gains benefits,
and the exclusion of municipal bonds. Id. at 61-62. The consumption category included
deductibility of state-local taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and
mortgage interest. Id. at 62. The employment tax expenditure included all untaxed
fringe benefits, and the need category encompassed the exclusions of various types of
transfer payments and pension allowances. Id. at 62-63. The study found that the
benefits were distributed regressively (i.e., the poor got more) in the need category,
and progressively in the investment category, but that the consumption and
employment categories showed no unified trend. Id. at 61-64.
175. On the efficiency front, some analysts insist that tax expenditures are less
efficient than an up-front direct subsidy. Burstein, supra note 100, at 72. The
exemption for the interest of municipal bonds from taxation is often cited as an
inefficient means of subsidizing state and local borrowing. See id. Reformers suggest
that the government should make direct subsidy payments to municipalities. See id.
(noting the potential cost savings to the federal government by using a direct subsidy
for municipal bonds instead ofthe current scheme of exclusion from taxation).
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use IRS agents as social engineers. Under these
marginal rate cuts, if one pays income taxes, one
gets a tax cut. It is that simple.176
~

);>

~

~

~

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Sen. Mack, Republican of Florida, speaking in favor of
reducing the so-called marriage penalty: "It has of late
become common practice to use the Tax Code for
purposes of social engineering, discouraging some actions
with the stick of tax penalties and encouraging others
with the carrot of tax preferences."i77
Sen. Roberts, Republican of Kansas, speaking against
either the income limitations on the $500 per child tax
credit contained in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 or
against the credit itself: "That is more social engineering
than tax policy."i7S
Then Rep. (now Sen.) Brownback, Republican of Kansas,
speaking on the matter of taxes: "It is time we cut back
on manipulation out of Washington and say that the Tax
Code is not for social engineering; it is not for economic
engineering. The Tax Code is for raising revenue for the
federal government."i79
Sen. Abraham, Republican of Michigan, speaking on the
conservative revolution of the 1994 election: "They saw
the dangers big-government social engineering posed to
our economy and brought about the most significant
political revolution in this country in 50 years, putting
the free-market Republican party in control of both
houses of Congress. mso
Rep. Cook, Republican from Utah, speaking on the topic
"Our Country Needs Sweeping Tax Reform":
Congress has used the American Tax Code as a
tool for social engineering, and that is not right.
Behaviors are rewarded or punished through a
little tinkering here and a little tinkering there of
the Tax Code. I believe that is a cynical and
improper use of our power. Americans pay taxes
to support a government created to serve them,
not to a government created to control them. lsl

147 CONGo REC.
146 CONGo REC.
143 CONGo REC.
142 CONGo REC.
144 CONGo REC.
143 CONGo REC.

H2214 (daily ed. May 16, 2001).
86825 (daily ed. July 14, 2000).
88455 (daily ed. July 31,1997).
H3457 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996).
87699 (daily ed. July 8, 1998).
H783 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1997).

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

452
~

Sen. Craig, Republican of Idaho, speaking on the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998:
The tax laws of our country should not be used for
social engineering, nor should they be designed in
such a way to tempt and enable legislators and
bureaucrats to manipulate social policy in this
country, to decide for the taxpayers what is good
for them, and to use the tax code and the IRS to
force them to behave accordingly. That impulse
for social engineering, directed from a
Washington, DC, that thought it was all-knowing,
is what grew the tax code and gave the IRS its
power. Decades of tax-and-spend Congress
empowered and encouraged the tax collector to
step outside the due process Americans expect in
every other encounter with their government, and
went about structuring social policy through tax
law; and they gained power and they gained
control. 182

~

Sen. Craig, Republican of Idaho, speaking on Tax Reform
generally: "The Internal Revenue Code is too complex,
produces arbitrary results, and is far too involved in
social engineering. m83
Senator Grams, Republican from Minnesota, speaking on
the Treasury and General Government Appropriation
Act, 1999:
The tax code must be terminated because it has
long been used as a tool for social engineering and
income redistribution rather than sound economic
policy. . .. Clearly, a system of graduated
marginal rates violates the principle of fairness.
In addition, special interest groups are often
unfairly rewarded by politicians with special tax
privileges. 1B4

~

~

182.
183.
184.
185.
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Sen. Shelby of Alabama, speaking on the introduction of
the Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997: "The
current Tax Code is the product of a 40-year experiment
with social engineering that has hampered the effort of
the American people to be free, bear the fruit of their
labor and ultimately live the American dream. m85

144 CONGo
143 CONGo
144 CONGo
143 CONGo

REC.
REC.
REC.
REC.

S7663 (daily ed.
S3196 (daily ed.
S9120 (daily ed.
S7770 (daily ed.

July
Apr.
July
July

8, 1998).
15, 1997).
28, 1998).
21, 1997).
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Rep. Dick Armey of Texas, on taxation generally: "as a
result of decades of social engineering, the United States
Tax Code has evolved into a complex maze of deductions,
credits, exemptions, and special preferences under which
taxpayers with same incomes can pay vastly different
amounts in taxes;"186 and in support of the Flat Tax:
"[after the enactment of a flat tax] [n]o longer will the
special interests be able to work their political mischief.
Nor will the social engineers be able to conduct their
experiments in the tax code."187
~ Rep. Chabot, Republican of Ohio: "To their [liberal
Democrats'] way of thinking, only if the government
decides whether they are worthy of some social
engineering should they get a tax cut.m88
~ Rep. Schaffer, Republican of Colorado: "Of course, April
15 is not a day liberals find too offensive. April 15 is a
high holy day for all the social engineers, the central
planners, and the big government liberals who worship
at the altar ofbureaucracy."189
These are not traditional economic arguments about the
efficiency of tax expenditures. These arguments do not even pick up
the standard rhetoric of tax policy. These are instead political
arguinents about the acceptable extent of government power. They
are informed by the writings of Nobel-prize winning economist
Freidrich Hayek, whose distrust of government power ran deep.19o
These arguments made against social engineering and the evil of
tax expenditures are no doubt made in sincerity by public-minded
citizens and grounded on deeply-held philosophical beliefs. Yet the
proponents of these massive changes seemingly fail to appreciate the
irony of their position-they want to throw out one set of socially
engineered incentives and replace them with a different set. All of
186. 146 CONGo REC. H8746 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2000).
187. Armey, supra note 104, at 97.
188. 145 CONGo REC. H6431 (daily ed. July 27,1999).
189. 145 CONGo REC. H2061 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1999).
190. See DICK ARMEY, THE FLAT TAX: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FACTS ON WHAT IT
WILL DO FOR YOU, YOUR COUNTRY, AND YOUR POCKETBOOK 38 (1996). Rep. Armey
criticizes the incentives that the current income tax creates for special interest groups
to seek special treatment. [d. He slightly misquotes Hayek as saying, '''[als the
coercive power of the state will alone decide who is to have what, the only power worth
having will be a share in the exercise of the power [sic].'" [d. (misquoting HAYEK, supra
note 159, at 107, who stated that the power worth having was "a share in the exercise
of this directing power"). While Rep. Armey and other self-identified conservatives are
fond of invoking Hayek's words, Hayek himself eschewed the "conservative" label and
instead identified himself as a libertarian. See F.A. HAYEK, Postscript: Why [ Am Not A
Conservative, in THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 397-411 (1960).
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the tax reform proposals have a social engineering component-they
are all designed to discourage consumption and encourage savings
and investment. 191 Indeed, the reform plans do not eliminate tax
incentives; they merely replace the existing incentives with a new
set. 192 If this is really what the process is about, the proponents
should be more candid about it.
Of course, since the days of the legal realists, jurisprudence has
been skeptical of the idea that any legal scheme can be truly
"neutral." In its strong form, the argument against the existence of
neutrality holds that because laws will always have distributive
effects on private decisions, the law can never achieve neutrality. As
it relates to the tax reform debate, however, a conservative could
assert that the neutrality argument is overstated. While any
intellectually honest proponent of radical tax reform would have to
concede that changing the tax system could result in the substitution
of one set of socially engineered incentives for another, that
proponent might nevertheless argue that there are degrees of non
neutrality. Whereas the current tax scheme specifically favors some
sectors of the economy and disfavors others, the reform proposals
merely establish rules that generally discourage consumption and
generally favor savings and investment. An intellectually honest
opponent of radical tax reform would have to concede the point that,
while this may be "social engineering," it does not have quite the
same heavy-handed government involvement as programs that
target particular preferences and activities and not others. While
these two hypothetical, intellectually honest debaters might view the
social engineering point this way, in the actual public policy debate
proponents of radical tax reform rally around the elimination of
social engineering and do not own up to the reality that they are not
actually eliminating social engineering but merely substituting a
perhaps less offensive variety of social engineering.

191. See THE NAT'L COMM'N ON ECON. GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, UNLEASIDNG
AMERICA'S POTENTIAL: A PRO-GROWTH, PRO-FAMILY TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 3-6 (1996), reprinted in The Kemp Comm'n Recommendations: A Small
Business Perspective: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 104th Congo
90-93 (1996). This official report of the National Commission on Economic Growth and
Tax Reform, sometimes called the "Kemp Commission" after its chairman, former
Congressman Jack Kemp, snidely refers to the mess made by "special interest[s]," id.
at 3, but then makes no bones about pushing a plan that, in their judgment, is
calculated to promote "families" and "growth," id. at 6,-both terms that mean
different things to different people and that smack of social engineering.
192. Eisner, supra note 59, at 44 ("[TJhe flat tax substitutes serious new distortions
for those it would eliminate.").
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B. Realignment of Tax Federalism

The other major conservative value advanced by radical tax
reform is further devolution of government functions, including tax
functions, away from Washington. 193 The conservative-led process of
shifting responsibilities for social programs from the federal
government to the states has been underway in earnest at least since
the Reagan administration.194 The proposed tax reforms fit nicely
with an overall strategy that seeks to combine several dearly held
tenets of conservatism relating to federalism (read: antipathy toward
Washington) and the appropriate size of government (read: small).195
First, conservatives prefer that political power be diffused and
decentralized. 196 Second, as a general matter they would prefer
193. See Michael J. Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS
OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 10, 13 ("Tax reforms can affect the federal system in
many ways, and we should favor those that strengthen it and devolve authority to
state and local government and private institutions to the extent possible."); see also
Armey, supra note 104, at 100 ("We flat taxers are populists. We flat-taxers think the
vast resources of this great commercial nation can be better allocated over kitchen
tables than over Capitol Hill's green felt tables."). This push to devolve the functions of
government is fueled in part by conservative fears that the federal government is out
of touch with the average American. For an expression of this sentiment in the tax
area, see PAYNE, supra note 132, at 163-77 (describing the "culture oftaxing" in which
the federal government imposes taxes while being basically oblivious to the taxpayer,
the government does not prepare tax burden studies, the experts who testifY before
Congress are predominantly IRS officials, past and present, the tax attorneys and
accountants have captured the process, and taxpayers do not get actively involved
because of the complexity and other constraints on their action). For an intriguing
proposal about how to devolve the collection of taxes down to the local level, see Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85
IOWA L. REV. 907 (2000) (arguing for a community approach).
194. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, DEVOLVING
FEDERAL PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVENUE SOURCES TO STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (1985) (examining the challenges of state and local governments taking
over programs previously administered by the federal government, including the
challenge of how to finance the programs).
195. These views may be held by people who do not consider themselves
"conservatives" as well. See John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Changing Public
Attitudes on Power and Taxation in the American Federal System, 31 PuBLIUS 205
(2001).
The federal government is viewed as providing citizens the least for their
money; the federal income tax, followed the by local property tax, is seen as
the worst tax; a majority of the public indicates that local governments need
more power; the public is most likely to identifY the federal government as
having too much power; and the public is least likely to say that the federal
government needs more power.
Id. at 205.
196. See CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA, 64-66 (2d ed. 1962) (noting
that a core belief of conservatives is the desirability of diffusing and balancing social,
economic, cultural and political power); DUNN AND WOODARD, supra note 155, at 7
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government to be as small as possible. 197 Third, as discussed above,
they generally oppose government social programs that engage in
social engineering. 198 The primary thrust of the conservative agenda
at the national level to address these three points has focused on
devolution of federal programs to the states through mechanisms like
the block grant, tax-reduction (funded by cuts to programs they do
not support), and structural changes designed to make the imposition
of new taxes more difficult, on the theory that government growth is
fueled by the availability of tax revenues. 199 But conservatives are
beginning to realize that the total burden of government is growing
fastest at the state and local level,20o prompting them to turn their
attention to that theater of operations.201
Viewing "government" in all its manifestations-federal, state
and local-as one giant "Leviathan" whose sole motive is to maximize
its revenues, the conservative tax reform proposals aim to cut the
monster down to size. 202 The reform proposals do this, as noted above,
("Shared traditional values held conservatism together during the turbulent postwar
era. These values emphasized local control, a sense of morality, and respect for
tradition'. ").
197. See Armey, supra note 104, at 100 ("We believe government should be open,
honest, direct-and smaller.").
198. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
199. See Gary S. Becker, Yes, Pass a Flat Tax-But Clamp a Lid on Spending, Bus.
WK., July 1, 1996, at 20 (drawing the connection between tax revenue and government
size).
200. In the recent economic downturn, many states have had to increase taxes even
as the federal government was cutting taxes. See Russell Gold, States' Tax Increases
Are Creating a Drag on the Overall Economy, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2002, at A2; Russell
Gold, States Are Seen Raising Taxes, Fees in Fiscal '03, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at
A2; Tom Herman, States May Need to Raise Taxes As Declines in Revenue Persist,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,2002, at D2.
201. See Howard Gleckman, Why Income Tax Cuts Won't Lessen the Tax Bite, BuS.
WK., Sept. 30, 1996, at 146 (noting that the overall tax burden in the past thirty years
has increased primarily because of increases in payroll taxes and state and local
taxes); see also Gary S. Becker, The States Should Find Their Own Way Out of This
Hole, Bus. WK., May 26, 2003, at 30 (opining that states have "expanded spending to
unsustainable levels").
202. The idea that all levels of government should be lumped together and treated
as "Leviathan" is certainly controversial, but one that appeals to the conservative
view. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 28-30 (1980) (using the
terminology of government as "Leviathan" and "Leviathan as monolith"). Concerns
about the Leviathan's rapacious appetite may be a bit overblown if one considers the
fact that the Leviathan has an encompassing interest in the productivity of the
economy that it is feeding off of, and so has a great incentive to moderate its own take
of the booty (that is, the Leviathan does not want to kill the goose that lays the golden
egg). This idea was recently developed by Mancur Olson. See MANCUR OLSON, POWER
AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 14-23
(2000). Others have reached similar conclusions about the Leviathan's behavior that
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by making the tax burden more visible and fomenting popular
opposition to taxes generally.203 This is easiest to see in the context of
a federal retail sales tax or VAT. If those proposals are enacted,
states will likely lose the ability to levy income taxes and will rely
even more on their own sales taxes or property taxes. But the
combined burden from a state and federal sales tax on every
economic transaction is bound to cause taxpayers to experience
"sticker shock."
The results of such a tax sticker shock are widely anticipated
and are, probably, intended consequences of the proposed reforms.
Tax commentators have identified several likely results from the
increase in state and local tax prices: (a) taxpayer pressure for
reduction of state and local taxes and spending; (b) taxpayer
opposition to future tax increases; (c) taxpayer hostility to
redistributive tax and spending schemes; and (d) political pressure to
shift the state and local tax burden away from households and
toward businesses (on the assumption that under the typical
consumption tax proposal businesses may continue to deduct state
and local taxes as ordinary business expenses).204 While the VAT or
sales tax example is easiest to see, all of the proposals will have the
effect of making the costs of local government more visible by
eliminating deductibility of state and local taxes and increasing the
costs of bond financing. Frustrated citizens are likely to lash out in
the place they have the loudest voice-town hall and the state
house. 205
To the extent that tax reform proposals fuel the dynamic of
making the total tax burden more visible and creating a mechanism
for local tax reduction, they move toward the three conservative goals
mentioned above. First, such a dynamic satisfies the conservative
preference that government decisions be made locally, where smaller

have been used to justify the progressive income tax-likening high marginal rates to
a governmental equity stake in enterprises that creates an incentive for the Leviathan
to establish conditions that will lead to taxpayers reaching the highest taxable rate
levels. E.g., Francis Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax (July
13, 1999), Washington Univ., Public Economics Working Paper No. 9907003, at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwppe/9907003.html.
203. See Blackwell, supra note 24, at 276-77 (advocating that taxes be as visible as
possible to remind taxpayers what the true cost of government is).
204. Mazerov supra note 50, at 1465-66 (listing the anticipated effects of tax law
changes on state and local taxpayer attitudes).
205. This dynamic is what produced the property tax revolts of the late 1970s and
1980s--citizens encountered visible and heavy taxes and they did something about it.
See Becker, supra note 199, at 20 ("The argument that resistance to higher taxes is
greater when the burden is heavier and more transparent is supported by the fact that
property owners led the tax rebellion in many states.").
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governmental units are more responsive to individual concerns. 206
Local political action for tax relief is the most likely course because
individuals can have a bigger impact locally where individual votes
are less diluted and therefore count relatively more than in national
elections. 207
Second, if all local governments find themselves in the same
boat, they will compete with each other to find the right level of taxes
and government benefits. 20B Although the federal deductibility of
state and local taxes has traditionally been justified as a way to
prevent sub-federal jurisdictions from competing with each other for
tax base,209 the elimination of that provision and the other impacts
discussed above will promote inter-jurisdictional competition.
Inevitably, conservatives believe this will require reductions in taxes
and government services, thereby achieving the second goal of
reducing the size of government. 210 In any event, if they fmd
themselves in fiscal distress, state and local governments will be
forced to cut programs, and, typically, in times of financial crisis,
such cuts come to public assistance and social services.21l In some
ways, this aspect of the tax reform impact is essentially an attempt

206. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
Cm. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (noting the responsiveness idea).
207. See generally Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Feckral System, 19
URBAN LAw. 553 (1987) (noting that, in addition, local group identity fosters the
building of consensus and promotes community involvement).
208. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 202, at 13-26 (advancing the argument
that competition among decentralized units of government can break the monopolistic
hold of a strong central government). But see William E. Oates, Feckralism and
Government Finance, in MODERN PuBLIC FINANCE 126, 148 (John M. Quigley &
Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994) (noting the lack of unambiguous empirical evidence to
support the proposition that decentralization in and of itself constrains the overall size
of government).
209. See Briffault, supra note 68, at 545 (noting the anti-competitive effect of
deductibility).
210. See Eisner, supra note 59, at 74.
[The flat tax] tilts the playing field against state and local investment and
other expenditures. . . . If we can assume that public choice has already
given us an optimum amount of state and local services and taxes-which
some may of course question-imposing an additional tax, which will cause
total taxes to exceed the value of the services they are presumed to finance,
can only discourage the provision of such services.
[d.
211. See Dick Netzer, The Effect of Tax Simplification on State and Local
Governments, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION 222, 234 (Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1985) (noting that state and local fiscal crises tend to result in
sharp cuts to social programs).
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to realize the theoretical predictions of Charles Tiebout's famous
model oflocal expenditures.212
In Tiebout's view, localizing government decisions about how
many government services to provide and how much to charge for
them would permit the development of a market-style mechanism for
satisfying citizen preferences for the appropriate level of government
involvement.213 Those who do not like the total package of services
and taxes in one town can vote with their feet and move to a town
that is more suited to their preferences. While the Tiebout model has
been a useful idea, it has obvious shortcomings as a descriptive
matter.214
Critics point out that the model fails because the exit option is
not costless, and, in fact, may be quite costly, and because local
taxpayers often lack the information necessary to make the
appropriate decisions.215 In addition, observed reality indicates that
localities supply public goods and services less as a function of local
preferences than as a function oflocal wealth. 216
Despite its shortcomings, the model holds great appeal and may,
in fact, inform a significant group of policy makers. It continues to
have explanatory power for some observed dynamics. For example, a
variation of the Tiebout idea justifies the observed competition
among states to improve legal regimes.217 In the tax arena, however,

212. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 416 (1956) (presenting a model, "which yields a solution for the level of
expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population
more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level").
213. [d. at 424.
214. See STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEBATES 215-26 (1993) (discussing the problem of tax federalism with
special attention to the Tiebout model and its shortcomings). But see THE VOLUNTARY
CITY: CHOICE, COMMUNITY, AND CML SOCIETY (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002)
(providing a series of essays tending to show that a market-based model for delivering
the package of municipal services, traditionally thought of as being the province of city
governments, may be an effective tool for revitalizing urban areas).
215. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR GREATER
UNIFORMITY 81-86 (1993) (criticizing the Tiebout model on grounds of exit costs and
information problems).
216. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II: Localism & Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 422-25 (1990) (noting that differences in jurisdictions' spending
patterns result from differences in fiscal capacity).
217. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76
VA. L. REV. 265, 291 (1990) (observing that the federal system has historically been
seen as "a device for achieving a more efficient legal system by encouraging
competition among the states").
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many observers worry that interstate tax competition has done more
harm than good.218
Finally, to the extent elimination of social engineering is part of
the conservative agenda, moving the focus of taxation to the local
level advances that goal as well. Tax analysts have understood for a
long time that not all levels of government are equally good at all
types of program finance. 219 Shifting the tax burden to state and local
governments will make financing social programs especially difficult.
Of course, from the conservative perspective, one of the most
nefarious social engineering schemes is the redistribution of income
from the wealthy to the poor. 220 By imposing a regressive federal level
tax and precluding state and local options for administering an
income tax, the new tax regime could effectively eliminate
redistribution plans, as local taxation schemes are ill-suited to carry
out redistributive efforts.221 To the extent these plans will encourage
a popular movement to reduce the tax burden overall or are coupled
with tax rebates, that development will also indirectly help the
crusade against social engineering. 222

218. FINANCING STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990S, supra note 61, at 29-31 (1993)
(noting that "interstate tax competition for economic development can undermine state
tax bases, produce tax inequities, and inhibit tax policy reforms-at times without
always providing compensatory benefits").
219. See Richard A. Musgrave, Who Should Tax, Where, and What?, in TAX
AsSIGNMENT IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2, 2-17 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1983)
(discussing the issue of which level of government is best suited to which kind of
program finance).
220. For the classic attack on progressivity and the dangers of redistribution
through the income tax scheme, see BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 85, at 70-90 (arguing
against progressivity on moral, economic and social grounds).
221. See Paul E. Peterson, Who Should Do What? Divided Responsibility in the
Federal System, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1995, at 6, 9 ("Any locality making a serious
attempt to tax the rich and give to the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive
away the rich. No amount of determination on the part of local political leaders can
make redistributive efforts succeed.").
222. Rep. Weldon of Florida puts the link between reduced tax revenues and
reduction in social engineering into a concise package: "The less revenue the
Government takes in, the less social engineering, the less redistribution of wealth and
the fewer new Government programs the left can oversee. That is why they hate tax
relief so much." 145 CONGo REC. H8475 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1999). Some have suggested
that the Republicans intentionally reduce tax revenue and run deficits in order to force
the next (presumably Democratic) administration to face the difficult choices for
bringing the budget back into balance. This certainly was borne out in the transition
from the Reagan administration through the first Bush administration and into the
Clinton administration. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX
NOTES 289, 292-93 (2001).
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CONCLUSION

Radical federal tax reform will have a radical effect on state and
local governments. It will curtail revenue raising options, increase
the costs of borrowing, and increase the tax price of state and local
government services. The traditional goals of tax policy will not be
well-served by the wrenching dislocations caused by these radical
plans, but the underlying conservative agenda nevertheless supports
changes in the tax system. The unstated (or at least understated)
reasons for conservative support of federal tax law reform is the
desire to bring about two major changes in government power: (1) to
remove the tax expenditure device from the federal government as a
tool of social engineering; and (2) to push more tax decisions to the
state and local level to promote competition between jurisdictions in
the hope that a dynamic will develop that shrinks the size of
government and cuts social programs.
On close examination, these goals are simplistic and even self
contradictory. With regard to the "elimination" of social engineering,
the reform proposals amount to nothing more than the desire to
replace one set of government incentives with a different set. 223 On
the point of re-balancing fiscal federalism, the push toward local
power places too much faith in a Tiebout-like world view. 224 In any
event, if the real reasons for tax reform include the ideas developed
in this Article, it would be desirable in the name of candor for
proponents to put aside the window-dressing language of traditional
tax policy analysis and instead talk about what they really want.
Radical tax reformers have made little progress in enacting their
schemes in part because they have failed to galvanize the American
people in a principled, policy-oriented way.225 If the American citizens
want to buy into one of these programs, as honestly stated, it should
be enacted, but if they do not agree with the underlying philosophy of
the promoters of these radical proposals, the proposals should be set
aside and more traditional approaches to tax reform should take
center stage.

223. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
225. Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233,
235, 251-52 (1999) (discussing the political shortcomings of the proponents of radical
tax reform).

